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SDI, SPACE ARMS

NO ACCORD REACHED BETWEEN U.S., JAPAN ON SDI PARTICIPATION

OW050335 Tokyo KYODO in English 0318 GMT 6 Jun 87

[Text] Washington, June 5 KYODO -- Hopes for an early conclusion of talks on Japanese participation in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program were dashed Friday as officials of the two nations failed to reach an accord on the fourth day of their negotiations.

Japanese diplomatic sources in Washington said the two countries have already agreed on a general framework of the projected agreement.

But, they said, the negotiators who began the talks in Washington on Tuesday have been taking an unexpectedly long time in deciding on the terminology to be used in documents involving the transfer to Japan of high-technology developed under the Star Wars project as well as the protection of intellectual property rights (patents).

Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone was earlier reported to have expressed hope the talks would be completed before the Venice summit of industrially advanced democracies next week.

The officials of the two countries are expected to continue the negotiations next week. The Japanese delegation is led by Makoto Watanabe, deputy director general of the Foreign Ministry's North American Affairs Bureau.

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CSO: 5260/102

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET OFFICIALS COMMENT ON JOINT DRAFT TREATY

Obukhov Press Conference

LD021838 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1720 GMT 2 Jun 87

["News Conference in Geneva" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Geneva, 2 Jun (TASS) -- A news conference by A. Obukhov, deputy leader of the USSR delegation to the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons, was held here today.

The Soviet representative drew attention to the results of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states which was held in Berlin on 28-29 May this year. Having noted that particular attention at the conference was concerned with questions of nuclear disarmament, he emphasized that the USSR delegation at the talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva is consistently moving matters toward realizing the aims laid down at the conference. A subject of primary attention, he said, is no undoubtedly the problem of medium-range missiles. This is the issue on which we have made most progress. As a result of the current round's work the sides have compiled the first joint draft text of a treaty on medium-range missiles reflecting the sides' positions as they exist at the present time. An important step has thus been taken at the talks, one creating the basis for further progress in agreeing a definitive draft text. Of course, there is still much work ahead. There are a number of aspects in the current U.S. position which are creating obstacles to progress. Among these, for instance, are the possibility envisaged by the U.S. approach of transforming U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe into other types of weapons, and the reluctance from the very outset to take part together with the Soviet side in the process of eliminating its own medium-range missiles. The United States claims to be able to site its remaining medium-range missiles in Alaska, that is, within range of Soviet territory, also do not serve the cause of lowering the level of military confrontation.

If, however, these and the other similar negative elements in the U.S. position are removed, then there exists every possibility for drawing up by the fall of this year a fully agreed upon joint draft treaty on medium-range missiles. Such a draft could be the object of discussion and signing at the next Soviet-U.S. summit meeting.

The Soviet side also pays great attention to two other areas of the talks on nuclear and space weapons -- on strategic offensive weapons and on space. We, the Soviet representative said, have introduced a draft of "key provisions of agreements" on the above-mentioned problems. Alongside the treaty on medium-range missiles, the document on "key provisions" could be an object for confirmation at a possible summit meeting.

Unfortunately, the U.S. position in these areas is not at all distinguished by a constructive nature. The draft presented by the U.S. side for a treaty on strategic offensive weapons contains a whole range of deliberately one-sided positions, aimed at obtaining military advantages for the United States. With regard to space, the U.S. position is aimed not at strengthening but at virtually destroying the ABM Treaty. At the same time, it should be clear that the spreading of the arms race into space would act as a catalyst for the arms race on Earth. In this case there could be simply no talk about radical reductions in strategic nuclear weapons.

The deputy head of the USSR's delegation said in conclusion that the Soviet side is fully resolved to continue to try to achieve effective decisions on all questions of the talks on nuclear and space weapons in the interests of strengthening peace and universal security.

Foreign Ministry News Conference

LD041736 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 4 Jun 87

[Text] Today a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists was held in the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center in Moscow. They have been informed about the fact that at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons, the first joint project of the treaty has been drafted by the group working on medium-range missiles. It registers not only the points on which both sides agree, but also the points on which there are divergences. The latter have arisen, first, because the U.S. side would like to redevelop medium-range missiles into other types of weapons rather than scrap them. Second, the U.S. side does not wish to start on the elimination simultaneously with the USSR. It wishes to do it later. The third disagreement is connected with the problem of deploying or not deploying U.S. medium-range missiles in Alaska.

Despite the disagreements -- in the opinion of Comrade Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, who led the briefing -- this project is the basis for advancing toward an agreement.

Touching on the strained situation in the Persian Gulf, he stated that the Soviet Union advocates the idea of uniting the efforts of the international community in order to ensure peace, security, and stability in this region. Unfortunately, as the Foreign Ministry spokesman noted, there is another point of view in the world. According to it, the situation in the Gulf is being used in order to build up the one-sided presence there of the United States. There are plans to get the NATO allies of the United States and Japan to join in this build-up.

A range of questions put by journalists to the spokesman concerned the flight of Rust, an FRG citizen. Answering these questions, the Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed hope that this flight will not have negative consequences for USSR-FRG relations. The FRG Government, he said, assessed Rust's action as unfortunate.

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BUDAPEST INTERVIEWS USSR'S GERASIMOV, FRG'S BAHR

LD120708 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1715 GMT 11 May 87

["Radio Diary" program, presented by Istvan Lipovecz with Colonel Peter Deak, Doctor of Sciences; Dr Istvan Koermendi, counsellor in the Foreign Ministry; and correspondents Istvan Kulcsar and Janos Elek; and with recorded comments by USSR Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov from Moscow and recorded comments by FRG Disarmament chief disarmament expert Egon Bahr from Hamburg]

[Excerpts] [Lipovecz] Good evening. You are listening to Radio Diary. Our topic today is military power relations. Our guests are Colonel Peter Deak, Doctor of Sciences, and Dr Istvan Koermendi, counsellor in the Foreign Ministry. They will answer your questions. [passage omitted]

[Elek] Col Deak, how do you define this concept of military power relations? What is it?

[Deak] Well, perhaps I could start by saying that military power relations do not exist on their own, but are part of the general, global power relations, which include the economic situation -- the state of the economic situation -- the extent of the society's development, its system of political institutions, its relationships, the population's moral condition, the level of technology or technologies, and a series of other issues. [passage omitted]

[Kulcsar] Now I will ask that question of the diplomat, whom we introduced before, Istvan Koermendi, counsellor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has just returned from Vienna to participate in this program. He arrived in Budapest by car this afternoon; this morning he was still sitting in on an international discussion. [passage omitted] The question, then, is: How do you define military power relations?

[Koermendi] As far as military power relations are concerned, the first thing I think of is the balance of power; and with regard to the balance of power, I think of the fact that it has developed to a terribly high level, both with respect to the Soviet Union and the United States, in both their military alliance systems. [passage omitted]

[Elek] We have a question from a Budapest listener, Laszlo Szigeti. He would like to know how we always say that the two opposing sides' forces are virtually equal, while the West keeps on talking about a Soviet threat?

[Kulcsar] Our guests are ready for the answer, but let us listen to two really competent opinions from New York and Moscow, which were recorded earlier by our correspondent. Elemer Csak interviewed Stephen Larrabee, scientific director of the Institute for Studies on East-West Security Affairs:

[Begin recording] [Csak] Of the two alliances, the two big powers, which do you think is the stronger? [passage omitted]

[Larrabee, in English with superimposed Hungarian translation] Well, in overall terms, I think the United States, in the political and economic field, is to a certain extent. However, in the military field there is more or less a strategic balance. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Lipovecz] So that was the opinion from the United States. At least as important, in terms of competence, is the interlocutor of correspondent Jozsef Barath in Moscow, Gennadiy Gerasimov, spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry:

[Begin recording] [Barath] According to the Soviet stance, there exists between the East and the West, between the Soviet Union and the United States, an approximate balance in every basic class of armaments. Right-wing Western experts, on the other hand, with every possible -- and at times even with every impossible -- argument, try to prove that the Soviet Union has superiority. The objective is clear: They want to get more funds for new weapons. It is also clear, however, that the basis of such explanations is not only the complexity of the weapon systems but the existing asymmetry. Can I ask you to describe the situation that has solved regarding the classes of armaments?

[Gerasimov, in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation] In the West, they are partial to harping on the various asymmetries, those that exist as well as those that have been made up, with the objective of proving that the Warsaw Treaty -- and within that primarily the Soviet Union -- has an overwhelming superiority in Europe. These arguments are used frequently, particularly now, to buttress the view that there is a need for nuclear deterrence, that nuclear weapons must be retained in Europe. In reality, at the same time, among the experts the debate is to come extent about something else. For example, there is in London an international institute that deals with strategic research. Every year it issues an assessment. In their publication of last year they said that in Europe neither the West nor the East has at its disposal a force that would be sufficient for a successful attack. So if the appropriate force is lacking then there is no threat of a Soviet attack, either.

As for concrete facts, the NATO countries in Europe, if we include France and Spain as well, have 94 battle-ready divisions. They could say that France is not in that military organization, but in the event of a military conflict, France and Spain also fall on the side of NATO. Thus, there are 94 divisions there. The Warsaw Treaty, on the other hand, has 78. The calculation can be continued even more precisely: A U.S. division represents 16-19,000 men; a West German one 23,000 men. At the same time, in the Warsaw Treaty a division represents 11-12,000 men. Again, the comparison is difficult, but it is evident that NATO keeps many more men armed.

As for European power relations, we think there is a relative balance of power. At the same time, it can be easily proved that if NATO accepts our proposal, after it is implemented they will have many more nuclear weapons, since both Britain and France will keep their nuclear forces. The U.S. nuclear submarines, which belong under the NATO command, will remain, just as will the U.S. Air Force with its nuclear bombs.

[Barath] When British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was in Moscow, Soviet papers reported the datum from one of her speeches that the ratio of tactical missiles in Europe is nine to one in favor of the Soviet Union. I have read no denial of this.

[Gerasiov] Well, there are various definitions. As far as I know, the British have no such definition as operational and tactical missile [hadmuevelti harcaszati raketa]. Many things still have to be brought to a common denominator here. But so that we may disarm scruples of this kind, the Soviet Union has offered this: If you are afraid of the operational and tactical missiles, all right, let us liquidate them as well, as sort of supplement in addition to the medium-range missiles. But now that we have gone out to meet the West, they say: There is no need to eliminate these kinds of missile entirely; let us rather discuss the equal level of operational and tactical missiles.

[Barath] Why is this standpoint dangerous?

[Gerasimov] Because if the West did not yet have a particular type of missile, its creation would now commence; new types of weapons will come into being to equalize the number of Soviet missiles belonging to the given class.

[Barath] In recent days, at the international theoretical conference held in honor of the PRAVDA anniversary, Anatoliy Dobrynin made an extremely interesting speech. One of the -- I think -- brand new theses in this was that according to the Soviet Union's stance, every state should be content with a level of armed forces that is still suitable for defense but insufficient for attack. Dobrynin said that the research of the European opposition social democratic parties in this regard were very interesting. I think that this is a principled novelty in the Soviet stance.

[Gerasimov] We happen to think that every country's military doctrine should be defensive in nature; and in accordance with such a defensive military doctrine, states would be allowed an appropriate defense, but would not have the means necessary for a successful attack. There is another category: rationally sufficient quantity. In other words, armaments should remain at a sufficient military level. In our day a paradoxical situation has come into being whereby both sides possess many more nuclear weapons than would be necessary to annihilate the opponent. For this reason, we propose that we should first of all reduce the nuclear armaments to the rationally sufficient amount, and then rid ourselves of them completely. We think the same thing about conventional weapons -- every country should have an amount necessary for defense but it should not be able to launch an attack. [end recording]

[Lipovecz] That was an interview with Gennadiy Gerasimov, Soviet foreign affairs spokesman.

[Elek] We continue with Radio Diary and the question: Who is the stronger? [passage omitted]

[Koermendi] I do not think that one can draw a conclusion from the present military power relations that any nuclear power, in any area of the field of power relations, has superiority that might be used for a political objective, or could be made use of during a conflict for his own ends. [passage omitted]

[Kulcsar] Janos Eleck and I met on a number of occasions in Geneva in recent years. Neither of us went there on holiday; we were both there to report on the Soviet-U.S. negotiations, including the Gorbachev-Reagan summit.

[Elek] A specialist told me there that if one wants to follow the Soviet-U.S. talks, one would do better to take an apartment instead of living in a hotel. Well, the negotiations are still under way in Geneva. We hear a lot about them, but learn little beyond the fact that they are secret negotiations. What can our military expert tell us?

[Deak] Well, the medium-range missiles are now the focus of the talks.

[Elek] And what is not at the center of the talks?

[Deak] I think that right now the issue of the militarization of space is not the focus of these talks. Right now it is a question of studying this issue. There is now some movement regarding reduction in strategic weapons on the basis of the proposals put forward in Reykjavik.

[Elek] So there are these three groups negotiating in Geneva. What is the justification for saying that the greatest interest, or shall we say expectation, concerns medium-range weapons?

[Deak] The justification is primarily that after Reykjavik, the Soviet Union decided to open the Reykjavik package and take out the first present it contained, the first problem, the issue of the medium-range missiles and European medium-range weapons, and treat this separately.

[Koermendi] Naturally, however, not entirely separate from the other problems.

[Kulcsar] Does the fact that this was taken out of the package mean that an agreement has thereby come about? Practically every other day we read predictions in the newspapers that a summit can be expected, that an agreement can be expected. What can the diplomat tell us about this?

[Koermendi] As Col Deak has said, since the negotiations on space defense or missile defense systems, strategic weapons, and the medium-range weapons took place in a parallel manner, it was not possible to solve them together. Consequently, to achieve a breakthrough, the Soviet Union selected the element that offered the greatest scope for a breakthrough, for reaching a first agreement -- the issue of the medium-range weapons. These have a range from 1,000 to 5,500 kilometers; as for examples, primarily the Soviet SS-20 and the NATO Pershing-2 and cruise missiles are involved.

[Elek] Were it possible to reach an agreement on dismantling these in Europe, could a Gorbachev-Reagan summit come about?

[Koermendi] It is difficult to determine in advance precisely the preconditions for a summit meeting. What I would say is that an agreement on the limitation of medium-range weapons would be the minimum that would make a summit possible under normal -- and, for both sides, acceptable -- conditions. However, naturally, since negotiations are also under way concerning other types of missiles, strategic missiles and antimissile defenses, it would be very useful if a summit meeting could register at least some sort of preliminary agreement on what sort of advance can be envisaged in these two other categories, or what sort of progress has so far been achieved in the negotiations.

[Elek] However, let us not conclude so easily on the first category either; the issue of the medium-range weapons is a rather complicated one. We have a foreign view on this question as well. The editor of this program, Ivan Lipovecz, interviewed Egon Bahr, the chief disarmament expert of the West German Social Democrats, in Hamburg last week.

[Begin recording] [Lipovecz] Mr Bahr, it is now a good 3 years since the deployment of medium-range missiles began in the Federal Republic. Would you have thought at that time that in such a relatively short time the situation would change so radically?

[Bahr, in German with superimposed Hungarian translation] I did not expect this, just as I did not expect Mr Gorbachev to become the general secretary of the CPSU.

[Lipovecz] Independent of Mr Gorbachev, did you expect changes to occur in the Soviet position, on the one hand, and -- surprisingly -- in the U.S. position?

[Bahr] I cannot separate this from the person. The change in the Soviet position, the extent of that change, cannot be separated from Gorbachev. He, or at least the Soviet leadership under his direction, took up a position which I think is historically correct. This is because it takes as its point of departure that one cannot demand greater security on either side regardless how one arms oneself. In our age it has become totally senseless for anyone to arm oneself to achieve superior strength, since this sort of superiority involves greater risks without offering any greater chances of victory. The only conclusion one can draw from this is that it is right to diminish all sorts of superiority in strength in any area. The Soviet proposals take this as their point of departure.

[Lipovecz] Is it not strange that for a whole decade, while the talks concerned only strategic weapons, the West Europeans were in full agreement with what went on? Now, however, when the medium-range weapons -- which concern them more closely -- are on the agenda, West European politicians keep standing up to say that something is wrong here.

[Bahr] You know, we are all inclined to overestimate the wisdom of the Europeans. However, objectively speaking, I can only state with some regret that it will take a while before the Europeans come to recognize their real interests. Europe is only now beginning to determine its own security interests, and to represent them in relation to both leading powers. I have noticed this also regarding the countries of Eastern Europe. Take Czechoslovakia, where new Soviet missiles have been deployed, whereby Czechoslovakia became the target of new Western strike plans: and the FRG, where new U.S. missiles have been deployed, whereby it has become the target of further strike plans by the Warsaw Treaty. There is nothing more natural in this world than for these countries to say that if we get rid of these types of weapons, then it will become unnecessary to have our territories targeted.

[Lipovecz] According to you, the great military potential is interpreted on both sides as a deterrent force. In other words, you too do not expect these weapons to be used in a war. In this case, how far would the reduction or total elimination of this arsenal change the military balance in other areas of armaments?

[Bahr] Fundamentally, as long as the number of strategic weapons is not reduced to zero, essentially nothing has changed. As I see it, this will take some time. We must also see that the chances for the Europeans to exert any influence are very small. They should concentrate on those things where they are given a chance to exert an influence. This is the stability that may be achieved in the area of traditional armaments between the Atlantic Ocean and the Urals. In the coming years this will definitely be the main scene of action in Europe from the diplomatic and political aspects. In this connection, my view is that we must certainly avoid one mistake: for 12 years in Vienna we each tried quite uselessly to prove to the other side how strong it is, how many men it keeps in arms. Every game of this sort with the figures is doomed to failure. We could go on negotiating until the end of the century without persuading the other side. Instead, we should concentrate on what the result should be.

Personally, at the moment I am not at all interested in the debate on how strong one side or the other is. What I am interested in is whether or not each side is willing to agree to eliminate its superiority in those areas where it is enjoying a superiority over the other side. Each side must preserve the ability to defend itself. The offensive capacities, however, must disappear. [end recording]

[Koermendi] During the talks on strategic weapons, the Americans in Geneva took a step backwards. They want to reduce the time limit on the agreement on antimissile systems from 10 to 7 years, and they want to raise from 5 to 7 years the proposed time limit for the 50 percent reduction of nuclear weapons. This means that by the time the 50 percent missile reduction came into being, they could create a shield in the space defense system that would increase the value of the remaining 50 percent.

[Kulcsar] So these are the two points of discussion in which, as Col Deak mentioned earlier, we have fewer hopes. We have more hope, however, in the matter of medium-range weapons, in which the result -- if there is an agreement -- could be a summit meeting this year perhaps.

[Koermendi] In this regard, allow me to refer to what Egon Bahr said, and which has perhaps appeared in an earlier interview. In Western Europe, people from certain political parties and military experts, insist that nuclear weapons remain in Western Europe, and, in Europe in general at a relatively high level. They are extremely cautious in whatever category arms are to be reduced. This is a conservative -- in the old, cautious meaning of the word -- conception of security that asserts there have been 4 decades of peace in Europe because of the very high military opposition: both halves are afraid that the other has too great a military capacity, that there is the possibility of mutual annihilation. As a result, this ensured peace.

[Kulcsar] The balance of terror.

[Koermendi] The balance of terror very strongly motivates the behavior of certain West European politicians and political parties. But despite this, I believe that the talks in the next period will prove that the balance of terror, or more precisely the balance of security, can now be brought about at a lower force level, at a level that does not mean an existential danger and constant threat to either side.

[Kulcsar] If this agreement comes about, it will be the first one where there is an actual reduction. All earlier agreements only decided the extent to which the number of weapons could be increased. This would be the first agreement whereby they would really take things out of the arsenals, where weapons would be destroyed.

[Koermendi] And they carry out checks.

[Elek] Tibor Hercsug, a listener, asks why we defend peace with weapons? Why can we not unilaterally reduce the weapons on our side? The same is proposed by Ilona Fekete, who asks what would happen if the Warsaw Treaty disarmed totally, unilaterally? In this case, would the NATO troops overrun Eastern Europe?

[Deak] Unilateral steps are not something new in the efforts of the Warsaw Treaty. From 1958 onward, unilateral disarmament steps have appeared continuously.

This year, we have the example of the moratorium, the problem of the Kola peninsula, and so on. However, responsible military leadership can only go so far. In this question it can only go to the limit of a certain maintenance of balance.

[Koermendi] I agree with what Col Deak said, but let me emphasize the opposite. In present international political conditions, the balance of forces ensures the one state that creates a situation for both sides -- it is acceptable in that one side does not have to fear the military superiority and political blackmail of the other.

[Elek] What would happen if one side unilaterally disarmed?

[Koermendi] There are defined limits to unilateral disarmament. In reality, the socialist countries, first and foremost the Soviet Union, took such steps, as was just mentioned. In the end, the proximity of an agreement on medium-range missiles is based on the Soviet Union making significant political diplomatic concessions from the stance it took during previous phases of talks.

[Elek] But this does not mean unilateral disarmament.

[Koermendi] This does mean unilateral disarmament. These unilateral steps, even if they have their own military significance, are basically of political, diplomatic significance, and these happen as part of preserving the general balance of power. The basic formula of the situation is that the existing balance brought about at the very high level of powers must be brought about somehow on a more secure, lower level. But the key to the situation is the existence of the balance of power. [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARY SPEAKS IN WEST BERLIN

PM191110 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 May 87 Second Edition p 4

[Report by own correspondents V. Kabanov, M. Podklyuchnikov: "A Crucial Stage"]

[Excerpts] West Berlin, 16 May--The Eighth Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin [SEW] Congress is in its 2d day. Today it was addressed by V.A. Medvedev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the head of the CPSU delegation. On the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee, he conveyed to the congress and to all West Berlin communists warm, fraternal greetings on behalf of Soviet Communists and the working people of the Soviet Union.

The voice of the communists in defense of peace and security and the new political thinking, the speaker went on, perhaps have a special meaning for West Berlin.

Political parties and movements of different trends now agree that Europe and the world as a whole are going through a crucial stage. For the first time a real opportunity exists to take the cause of disarmament out of the impasse and substantially lessen the nuclear threat. The Soviet Union and the other European socialist states, seeking to resolve this historical task, have put forward a package of appropriate initiatives.

We are convinced, the speaker went on, that the first practical step along the path of disarmament -- the elimination of the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe -- would facilitate subsequent steps, the strengthening of trust and the expansion of cooperation, and the implementation of all-European plans in the sphere of the economy, science, and technology, the exchange of spiritual values, and the protection of nature, in a word, the successful building of what M.S. Gorbachev metaphorically described as the "all-European house."

The Soviet Union approaches the problem of West Berlin with the utmost responsibility. Here we take into account the whole range of interests -- the interests of European peace, of our country and its allies, and, of course, of the city itself. The future of West Berlin and the city's opportunity to live and develop in a tranquil atmosphere depend entirely on a peaceful atmosphere in Europe and the deepening of mutual understanding and cooperation between the West and East of our continent. In turn, the West Berlin situation has an impact on the all-European atmosphere.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW: 'NO LOGIC' IN U.S. APPROACH TO SRINF ISSUE

LD192011 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 19 May 87

[Talk by "international affairs journalist" Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin in connection with the upcoming conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states: "The Community of Socialist States: A Determining Factor in Strengthening Peace"]

[Text] The conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states, to be held in Berlin during the last 10 days of May, comes at a highly responsible moment in terms of world development. There have perhaps never before been such serious and realistic opportunities for achieving a major breakthrough toward practical solutions to cut the arms races, as exist today. I have in mind, of course, the problem of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe and sharply limiting this class of weapons in the Asiatic part of our country, and on the territory of the United States.

The practical contours of this agreement were delineated clearly and absolutely back in Reykjavik, when understanding was reached between the Soviet Union and the United States on the necessity of eliminating this class of weapons from the European Continent and on substantially limiting this class of weapons, as I have already mentioned, in the Asiatic part of our territory, and correspondingly, on U.S. territory. Then, following the comparatively recent talks in Moscow, the negotiations that were conducted between U.S. Secretary of State Shultz and our minister of foreign affairs, Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, and then following the meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and the U.S. secretary of state, a composition such as this took shape:

As concerns medium-range missiles, the United States agrees with the Soviet Union's viewpoint. Yes, these missiles should be eliminated in Europe and sharply limited in the Asiatic part of our country and on the territory of the United States. However--as always, the United States could not manage without a however--they declared that the Soviet Union has an obvious advantage in operational and tactical missiles and that this problem must be resolved.

That is true; this problem, of course, must be resolved, and the Soviet Union said as much at once, even back in Reykjavik. As soon as we come to an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles, we will withdraw, by agreement with the Governments of the GDR and CSSR, our operational and tactical missiles from the territory of those countries. However, as concerns the other operational and tactical missiles -- we have only a few tens of these Soviet missiles -- we will enter into negotiations and, in the meantime, impose a freeze; we shall not increase the number of this type of weapon.

Talking to Shultz in Moscow, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev elucidated the Soviet position. He stated as follows: We are genuinely ready to freeze this type of weapon, and not just to freeze it, but immediately to enter into negotiations on its fate, with a view to eliminating this class of weapons, as well. The U.S. position, as can be judged from the statements of U.S. politicians and the U.S. press, however, looks otherwise. They say: Yes, we will eliminate medium-range missiles, but as for operational and tactical missiles, the United States first must consult its partners on the fate of these missiles, and then, the United States would find it preferable to have the right to provide itself with the same number of operational and tactical missiles in Europe as the Soviet Union has.

There is, of course, absolutely no logic here. If the Soviet Union proposes zero for both medium-range missiles and for operational and tactical missiles, why hold talks on any new levels?

This is how the picture looks with regard to this equation in Soviet-U.S. relations, but Europe and the European interest also come into this equation. Where the West European countries are concerned, the range of positions is fairly large. Many West European countries are voting with both hands for the Soviet initiative and the Soviet proposals, and are in solidarity with the Soviet position. At the same time, however, influential West European countries such as Britain, France, and West Germany obviously are having some doubts and are expressing huge numbers of provisos with regard to the fate of the operational and tactical missiles.

It is, however, a fairly interesting picture, all in all. The arguments put forward there are not, I would say, particularly weighty, but rather obstinate and tiresome arguments, clearly betraying unwillingness to go so far as the elimination of operational and tactical weapons. Well, what do they say? They say that thereby a breach would emerge between the strategic armaments of the United States and its European presence, that there would be no link-up here, and that thereby Europe would turn out to be defenseless. The arguments about some imaginary superiority on the part of the Soviet Union in conventional weapons are cited, of course, and so on and so forth.

In any event, however, everyone acknowledges, and it really can be said without any reservation whatsoever, that now the opportunity for a breakthrough and a major agreement on the elimination, essentially, of an entire class of weapons is a reality.

Now, when we have come -- in European policy and, indeed, in world policy as such -- to such a counterpoint when we can, in essence, advance to completely new horizons in political dialogue, to new horizons in the sense of what decisions can be made, here, of course, the significance of the socialist countries' coordination in foreign policy actions is enhanced sharply. In this light, the Berlin conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member-states offers the necessary possibility to analyze jointly the state of affairs that has come about and to decide

what to do next. For a great deal of political work lies ahead, both with competent political circles of the West European states and, of course, with the West European public, which has been far from silent.

The contours of this work, the contours of possible solutions, are outlined in other initiatives, as well, not just by the Soviet Union but also by other Warsaw Pact members. The contours of possible advances also are outlined in the Jaruzelski plan, a very interesting plan, rich in content, which proposes a whole series of ideas within the framework of which further work can be done, both in terms of curtailing nuclear weapons in Europe, and in terms of eliminating and curtailing conventional weapons that are particularly accurate and have great strike capacity. Of great interest is our Polish comrade's idea about the obligatorily defensive nature of military doctrines, which would be used in the European Armed Forces, there is, of course, the valuable idea about very strict control [kontrol] over measures to be taken for the demilitarization of Europe.

So, ahead of us are very interesting events, very important events. In this regard, one can expect a great deal from the conference of the Political Consultative Committee. Incidentally, the Warsaw Pact members have always dealt primarily with European affairs, of course. European affairs are an organic part of the general world situation, and in this respect I think that the forthcoming work of the Political Consultative Committee conference and its decisions will have a beneficial effect on the process that is now gathering strength and about which we were, indeed, speaking at the beginning. I think that the decisions of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee will make it possible not to let slip a single opportunity to introduce new elements into European and world policy.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S GERASIMOV ON INTERVIEWED MISSILE DEAL, SUMMIT CHANCES

AU271920 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 23 May 87 p 6

[Interview with Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Directorate and spokesman of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by Dusan Rovensky: "It Depends on the Political Will" -- date and place not given]

[Text] Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Administration and spokesman of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been in Czechoslovakia in the last few days. We have taken this opportunity to interview him.

[Rovensky] The Soviet-U.S. dialogue on medium-range missiles in Geneva seems to have entered the decisive period. What is typical for the U.S. positions? Do they suggest the talks could have a positive outcome?

[Gerasimov] I agree our Geneva talks on eliminating medium-range missiles are rather close to conclusion. They are not in the final stage outright but, at any rate, it should be possible to conclude them relatively soon if both sides show the political will to do so. In that case, the negotiations would be about the technical details of the agreement's verification [kontrola]. The Soviet Union is ready to go very far on this point to remove any U.S. misgivings. Of course, it is necessary to bear in mind that we, too, insist on reciprocity and must be completely assured of the U.S. side's observance of the agreement. But the situation is getting more complicated here. The United States says that it must consult its allies, adding that it does not want to exert pressure on them. Its allies say that they do not want to hurry, that they must explore the issue. This stand is rather strange because what is now being proposed by the Soviet side is what the Western side proposed several years ago -- in 1981.

We agree with the zero option. Now I often read in U.S. and other newspapers commentaries that the zero option itself never was seriously considered, that it was assumed in proposing it that the Soviet Union would say no. Now the Soviet Union says yes. It is thus becoming apparent that the Western stand was not sincere then, but that it was a trick.

The allies are now split and confused. Margaret Thatcher says one thing, Helmut Kohl another. They do not have a joint stand. Even the recent meeting of the NATO nuclear planning group in Norway failed to reach a common position. This, of course, makes it difficult to reply to the question when and whether at all it is possible to expect a positive outcome of the talks.

Here we must naturally consider the U.S. domestic political scene as well. It can be assumed that the Reagan administration, whose term of office is drawing to an end, would like to go down in history with some results. It does not have these results in domestic policy because the economic situation in the country now is such that it has nothing to brag about. Apart from this, the Irangate scandal is coming to a head. It is thus evident that they have nothing to boast of domestically. As for foreign policy, an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles could provide the Reagan administration with some sort of a final chord before its departure to the past.

But I repeat that in the United States itself there are forces which are opposed in principle to this agreement. They include also Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. [paragraph continues]

These forces are afraid of an agreement especially because it would be the first agreement on a genuine reduction of nuclear weapons. They are afraid that after a first step a second would follow, that one stone would touch off an avalanche, that a second step would be followed by a third step and the process of nuclear disarmament as proposed by the Soviet Union would start.

[Rovensky] The possibility has surfaced at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament of concluding an international convention banning chemical weapons. What is the Soviet Union's position in this regard and what prospects for such a convention do you see?

[Gerasimov] Indeed, the talks in Geneva have made a long way toward the conclusion of an agreement banning chemical weapons. A special plant for the liquidation of chemical weapons is under construction in the Soviet Union. As far as verification [kontrola] is concerned, there is a good British proposal, there is a Soviet proposal, the possibility of a compromise exists. If there is political will, the changes in the area of banning chemical weapons, an area in which a great step ahead has been made, will be big enough. But, once again, the final word is up to the West.

[Rovensky] In a few recent statements you have spoken about the prospects for another Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. There is not much time left, in view of the presidential elections in the United States in November 1988. Do you think that a new summit is realistic and, if so, under what conditions?

[Gerasimov] We have said that if an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles is reached and, apart from that, if we agree with the Americans on key issues regarding reducing strategic offensive weapons and with regard to the "Star Wars," this would be a sufficient basis for a summit meeting to take place. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev does not conceal the fact he is ready to go to the United States. But he cannot go there as a tourist. He already made President Reagan's acquaintance in Geneva and this getting-to-know-each-other continued in Reykjavik. To become acquainted for the third time does not make any sense. It is time for deeds. That is why, if diplomats reach sufficient progress in Geneva in summer, a summit could then be expected to take place in autumn.

Why in autumn? Because this is when the regular session of the UN General Assembly will be held, which is sometimes attended not only by ministers of foreign affairs but also by the leading representatives of various countries. Besides, autumn will be sufficiently before the U.S. presidential elections.

It is not enough to conclude an agreement. The conclusion of an agreement is certainly a big success but it is not everything. This holds particularly true for the United States where Congress and the Senate will yet have to ratify this agreement. That requires time.

Alexis de Tocqueville, a 19th century French diplomat, wrote the book "Democracy in America," which is still regarded as a classic. He wrote that once the election campaign begins in America, no one cares about foreign policy. For 1 year, 1 and 1/2 years, or 2 years after a presidential election, the new administration's foreign policy is just getting started. For 6 months or a year it then deals with foreign policy before the start of a new presidential campaign. Foreign policy is then moved to the sidelines again. Well, this insight of the preceding century holds true even today to a considerable extent.

It is precisely the domestic political situation that has a great impact on U.S. foreign policy.

Instead of thinking about ways of preserving peace and removing the nuclear threat hovering over mankind, the U.S. Administration thinks about ways of ensuring victory in the next elections.

[Rovensky] You are chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What are the tasks of this administration and what are your experiences as the ministry's spokesman?

[Gerasimov] The Information Directorate was formed a year ago and I was entrusted with being its chief. I had not worked as a diplomat until then, I had worked as a journalist. I spent many years working in the NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY and in the last 3 years I served as chief editor of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. After receiving the invitation I thought about it, consulted my wife, and agreed.

Our assignment is to make sure that the world understands Soviet foreign policy. That is why we organize a number of news conferences. Twice a week we organize briefings.

Our assignment is to maintain continuous presence at the international "information market." Judging from the echo, including that coming from Western correspondents, our new policy of "glasnost" [preceding word in Russian] is meeting with success. It makes the work of foreign correspondents easier. I believe it facilitates the understanding of the true aspirations of the Soviet Union by the public of other countries, particularly in capitalist countries.

They always ascribed ill designs to us -- that we want to seize Europe, America, and Nicaragua by a surprise attack, that we want to get hold of the whole of the Middle East by way of Afghanistan, and so forth. Unfortunately, this stereotype about the "Soviet menace" lingers on in the thinking of many people in the West.

I believe our daily contacts with representatives of the international press -- there are 430 foreign correspondents in Moscow -- help to show what we really want. That is really not much. We want to ensure peaceful conditions for the solution of our internal problems, for our restructuring. We want all nations to live in peace and contentment.

That is why we proposed on 15 January 1986 the plan for a complete elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We are naturally prepared to reduce also conventional armaments and armed forces.

We want people to come to understand that we, the whole of mankind, are endangered by the nuclear threat and that we must join our forces to remove this threat.

I hope that with our work we contribute our modest share to making the realization of this threat percolate not only into public opinion, but also into the ruling circles of the West, and that this realization at the same time helps to make the relations between our countries -- socialist, capitalist, and developing ones -- civilized, such as exist in normal everyday human life when everyone respects the rights of others.

Our aim is a civilized community in which everyone is the maker of his own fortunes and in which all people, all states and nations live in normal human coexistence.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA REVIEWS DISARMAMENT TALKS, WEEK'S EVENTS

PM271245 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 May 87 Second Edition p 4

["International Review" column by Boris Orekhov]

[Excerpt] Toward an Agreement or Away From It? [subhead]

According to news agency reports, somewhere in the middle of this year our world population will reach 5 billion. In what kind of conditions, what kind of international climate will these 5 billion people live? Will the nuclear threat still be hanging over their heads as it is today? Or will something happen to make people breathe a sigh of relief? This depends on the people themselves and, of course, mainly on those who have political powers and who play a decisive role in determining states' foreign policy courses.

The complex of interconnected, interrelated issues of removing military tension in the world and reducing confrontation between states with different political systems is vast and complicated. The comprehensive study of these issues and current attempts to unravel individual knots have recently shown that there is one issue to which a solution is quite feasible and accessible. It is the issue of removing U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles from Europe and sharply limiting them in the Asian part of the USSR and on U.S. territory.

As everyone remembers, a proposal relating to this issue -- a very specific, detailed proposal -- was put forward by our country 3 months ago, on 28 February. Since then this subject has been discussed in political circles and the mass media in the West. It was immediately pointed out -- and rightly so -- that the 28 February proposal is a swift move by the Soviet side to meet the positions of the United States and its West European allies. As M.S. Gorbachev noted in his recently published replies to questions by the Italian newspaper L'UNITA's editorial board, several weeks ago it seemed that an agreement was just a few steps away. The positive reaction everywhere to this made people think along those lines.

Three months have passed, however, and there is still no agreement. What is the matter? The same old problem. We seem to be hearing the same old story from the West again. Without going into details, from the outside the situation is highly reminiscent of Reykjavik, when the world was literally a step away from a historic agreement between the two great powers on a radical arms reduction, but the stand taken by our partners in the talks did not make it possible to take this last step. And now? The further we move away from 28 February, the more "arguments" and "provisions" casting doubt on the Soviet proposal are appearing in NATO countries and, what is particularly strange, in some West European countries which, one would think, would have a particular interest in getting rid of their missiles.

It is impossible not to notice that the Soviet initiative to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe has clearly taken many in the West unawares. Surely this is shown by the present paradoxical situation? Not so long ago some Western politicians were trying to persuade Europeans that they were in favor of the zero option regarding medium-range missiles in Europe while the Soviet Union, they said, was linking this problem in a package with other issues relating to nuclear arms and space weapons and thereby holding matters back.

Today, however, when the zero option has been proposed by the Soviet Union, these same politicians are looking for pretexts to wreck if not at least prolong and postpone the achievement of an accord. First they said the question of medium-range missiles could not be resolved without simultaneously removing operational and tactical missiles. Then tactical nuclear arms began to be brought into the matter. These were followed by battlefield nuclear weapons and then conventional arms and armed forces.

It cannot be denied that all these problems are in themselves very serious. But they cannot all be taken up and resolved at once. It would be terrible if the solution to these undisputedly important problems were to be used to drag out the process of resolving an issue which is, so to speak, as clear as daylight.

The FRG Government, on whose decision a great deal depends, is making heavy weather of formulating its position regarding the Soviet proposals. There is still no unity of views on the Rhine concerning the problem of eliminating the missiles: Whereas the Free Democrats who are part of the ruling coalition have spoken in favor of the USSR initiative, representatives of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) continue to say that they do not wish to accept the Soviet proposal to remove medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles from Europe.

Describing the prospects in Geneva, French President F. Mitterrand said recently: "For the first time the United States and the Soviet Union have shown a willingness for real disarmament. Consequently I support the stand taken by U.S. President R. Reagan and M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee." While saying that possible disarmament in the class of operational and tactical missiles is "a step in the right direction," the president still threw a lifebelt to the FRG chancellor. "When the FRG Government has finally made its position clear, we will see what to do," he said.

The approach taken by the Italian Government is clearer; G. Andreotti, Italian foreign minister, said recently that it positively appraises the proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe, although Italy still has to work out its final position on this issue and "is continuing consultations with the United States and other NATO allies in Europe." G. Andreotti notes that if an agreement were to be concluded on medium-range missiles, for the first time in the history of arms control we would achieve a substantial reduction in missiles already deployed, and this progress could "open up prospects which could not even have been imagined several years ago."

An interesting detail: There is as yet no agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles, but the rumor has already leaked out from the West that the Pentagon and NATO are taking measures in advance to ensure that this agreement is basically reduced to naught in the event of its being signed. An anonymous review appeared in the British newspaper NEWS ON SUNDAY, which said that in case a Soviet-U.S. treaty is signed on medium-range missiles, U.S. and NATO military leaders "are drawing up a secret plan to

deceive the Russians." The newspaper writes that this plan envisages trebling the number of U.S. cruise missiles in Britain by means of installing 230 cruise missiles on U.S. bombers based at Fairford and another 108 missiles on submarines at Holy Loch.

So this is the way some people are preparing for agreement, this is the way they are preparing to disarm....

Unified Principle [subhead]

Our country is now actively pursuing a policy aimed at freeing Europe from nuclear arms.

But we are not doing this to transfer the nuclear danger to different regions of the world. Our aim is to begin with Europe, where the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons are concentrated, and then move on to freeing all the continents from nuclear arms by the year 2000 and, on this basis, create a comprehensive international peace and security system.

At the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik we agreed that the USSR and the United States would each keep 100 warheads on medium-range missiles. This was done with the sole aim of counterbalancing the U.S. nuclear means which are now concentrated in the Asian and Pacific region in considerable quantities: The United States has concentrated a powerful nuclear strike force in this region and is building up its nuclear arsenals on its ships and at its military bases located in foreign territory. Of course, the problem of the complete, global elimination of medium-range missiles is on the agenda and the Soviet Union has many times stated its willingness to resolve it. But for this to happen the United States would have to agree to eliminate its nuclear means in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines and also to withdrawing its aircraft carriers to positions behind agreed lines.

The question of ways leading to the removal of nuclear arms from Asia was discussed in the course of the recent official friendly visit to the Soviet Union by Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee. During his speech at the dinner given in honor of the high-ranking guest, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee reaffirmed that our country proposes making the initial moves now along roads leading to the removal of nuclear weapons from Asia. The creation of nuclear-free zones is considered an important step in this direction. The Soviet Union has already signed the appropriate protocols toward a treaty on creating such a zone in the South Pacific and supports the proposals of other countries to create zones free of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia and the Korean peninsula. It is in favor of convening an international conference on the Indian Ocean, at which the question of declaring this region a peace zone could be discussed and decided.

The USSR's position regarding the Asian and Pacific region, which was formulated by the Soviet side during the visit by Nguyen Van Linh, confirms that the Soviet Union does not divide the principles of its international policy into European and Asian sections. In today's interdependent world the peoples of all continents share common hopes and concerns. We are in favor of peace and good-neighborliness, trust and mutual understanding, and the mutually advantageous exchange of goods, technology, and cultural values prevailing in relations between states in the Asian and Pacific region, which is becoming increasingly important in international life.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET ARMY PAPER ASSESSES U.S., WEST EUROPEAN DEBATES

PM251221 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 May 87 First Edition p 3

["Military-Political Review" by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov: "The Peoples Expect an Answer"]

[Text] Any choice is agonizing. That is an approximate translation of the old German saying which bears witness to how complicated it is to choose one out of numerous possible options. Recent events prove that this saying is entirely applicable to international affairs, to the solution of the Euromissiles problem, for instance. True, there are not that many serious options to choose from. Nonetheless, for the umpteenth month now NATO circles have been agonizing over what to decide: to give a positive reply to the Soviet proposal to eliminate U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and thus effect a real breakthrough in the field of nuclear disarmament, or to retain their loyalty to their old militarist course which is in fact leading to nuclear catastrophe.

Life itself has faced the West with the need to make this choice. The West cannot ignore the Soviet initiatives which have met with such widespread approval among the peoples. But so far the NATO states are still not ready for a resolute step toward a nuclear-free world. Some governments in West Europe still have not decided for themselves how to treat the prospect of the elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles on the continent.

Differences in the NATO camp on this very important current issue were graphically manifested during the session of the bloc's Nuclear Planning Group in the Norwegian town of Stavanger. The session failed to come up with a unified approach on the part of the allies toward the Euromissiles problem. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already written about this. Nor was there any unanimity on this question at the NATO Assembly's spring session. This session of the NATO parliamentary organ was held in the Canadian city of Quebec. It is expected that the final answer to the Soviet peace initiatives will be elaborated at the NATO Council session scheduled for June. As is well known, it will be held in Reykjavik -- in the Icelandic capital where the Soviet-U.S. accords were born which aroused in the peoples of the world hopes for the planet's liberation from the nuclear threat. The immediate future will show whether these hopes are justified and whether the Atlanticists will be able to renounce the old stereotypes and make the correct choice.

There are influential forces in the West which are not interested in Europe's liberation from nuclear arsenals. They are the ones trying to do everything to drag out and halt the solution of the Euromissiles problem, trying to create an endless

pernicious chain of ever new "strings." You only have to recall the activeness of the representatives of the extreme right-wing faction of the West German conservative Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union [CDU/CSU]. FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner, A. Dregger, chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction, and those who think like them are openly militating for the withdrawal of medium-range missiles from Europe to be "compensated" by new operational-tactical missiles. There are also people like this in other Western states on both sides of the ocean. They are the ones who first said that the question of medium-range missiles cannot be resolved without the simultaneous elimination of operational-tactical missiles and then began also to include tactical nuclear weapons, battlefield nuclear weapons, and then conventional armaments and armed forces. The Soviet Union and its allies are prepared to resolve all these serious questions. But these problems cannot be used for all kinds of delays. This idea is shared by many Western politicians. "It seems somewhat surprising to me," Norwegian Defense Minister J. Holst noted, "that when an agreement is becoming a real possibility some people are trying to avoid it."

The press assessed the recent statement by the FRG federal chancellor, who proposed holding talks on nuclear weapons with a range of "0-1,000 km" linking them with the talks on conventional and chemical weapons, as a desire to reject the "zero-zero option." The chancellor's statement fails to stipulate the date or form of these talks and lacks any tie-in with the corresponding proposals from the Warsaw Pact states. "You do not need to have any malicious intention," the newspaper UNSERE ZEIT wrote on the subject, "to see in H. Kohl's statement the desire...to complicate the talks so that their failure can be preprogrammed."

It should be noted that Bonn's unconstructive position on nuclear disarmament questions was the reason for the grave defeat suffered last Sunday by the FRG ruling parties at the elections to the Rheinland-Pfalz Landtag and the Hamburg city assembly of deputies. "The party's stance on disarmament issues caused the principal damage to the CDU," STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG wrote. "Many voters were unable to comprehend how the 'zero option' previously presented as an ideal had suddenly ceased to be the aim of the FRG Government's policy."

The peoples of Europe do not want to live under the protection of U.S. nuclear missiles. An increasing number of people realize that the presence of the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in West Europe in no way enhances security here.

Taking this into account, the champions of the arms race are doing everything to retain their innocence and at the same time acquire militarist capital, so to speak. As THE WASHINGTON POST has noted, the NATO countries' defense ministers who gathered in Stavanger, while welcoming the "improvement in the prospects" of a U.S.-Soviet agreement on eliminating medium-range nuclear missiles, at the same time confirmed their intention to modernize nuclear weapons in Europe. According to press reports, Washington is preparing plans for the so-called "compensation" of the planned reduction of nuclear armaments in Europe. The British newspaper NEWS ON SUNDAY has assessed these plans as "a swindle." The Pentagon and NATO, the newspaper attests, intend in particular not to eliminate medium-range nuclear missile weapons stationed on British territory but merely to remove them from ground-based launchers and station them on strategic bombers and submarines. In addition it is planned to "transfer" these missiles to a different category and thus remove them from the framework of an agreement on medium-range missiles.

After all, what will happen if the Soviet Union agrees to this idea during the talks on medium-range missiles? In that case, NEWS ON SUNDAY writes, all 96 cruise missiles

installed at the Greenham Common base will be dismantled and plans to place a further 64 such missiles at the Molesworth base will be cancelled. But instead the U.S. bombers stationed at the U.S. Air Force base in Fairford will, according to the newspaper, be equipped with at least 230 cruise missiles. A further 108 of these missiles will be taken on by submarines based at Holy Loch. As a result of this "compensation" the number of cruise missiles stationed in Britain could be trebled. That is the ploy that the missile champions intend to put into action, considering, utterly futilely, that the Soviet Union will agree to lesser security for itself and its allies.

British Defense Secretary G. Younger has admitted the possibility that Britain might place new nuclear weapons on its territory to help NATO "to compensate for the disappearance of U.S. cruise missiles at Greenham Common and other intermediate-range missiles from Europe as a result of an arms control agreement with Moscow." The possibility of Britain becoming a base for submarines equipped with cruise missiles, he said, "figured in all lists of potential measures" to eliminate any gaps forming in the NATO "nuclear deterrent" forces as a result of the loss of the ground-based cruise missiles and Pershing 2 missiles. According to THE FINANCIAL TIMES this was the government's first public recognition of the fact that "an agreement between the superpowers on missiles in Europe could simply alter the nature of nuclear weapons in Britain and continental Europe and fail to lead to substantial reductions of these weapons."

Thus, to the sound of peace-loving rhetoric, everything is being done to prevent a fair agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe — an agreement which encroaches on no one's security. After all, the aim of this agreement is to lower the level of nuclear antagonism on the continent, to reduce the threat of a nuclear flare-up. Will the attainment of this goal be promoted by the "political agreement" which, according to the newspaper THE TIMES, has been reached between the United States, Britain, and the FRG on the issue of the placement of "a new stratum of nuclear weapons in Europe" if an agreement on arms reduction is concluded? The answer is obvious.

In considering the "new stratum," the Pentagon is not ceasing its dangerous manipulations with its "old" stratum. [paragraph continues]

It is hard to assess as anything other than a challenge to the world public the "carbon blazer" military maneuvers which recently ended in West Germany's Baden-Wuerttemberg and in which 72 U.S. Pershing-2 nuclear missiles took part. And what is the worth of the routine simultaneous launches of six such missiles in the United States recently? All this attests that the Pentagon intends in actual fact to keep these missiles in Europe, perhaps merely converting them to Pershing-1B missiles. Let us recall that the reverse operation, according to specialists' assessments, takes just 48 hours.

The U.S. weekly TIME magazine has reported that active work is now under way in the United States to create the "third generation" of nuclear weapons adapted for use in space. One feature of these weapons is the relatively small yield of their charges and the possibility of a "guided" nuclear explosion. Thus, the magazine writes, it will be possible 'to strike specific targets without destroying an entire city....' If these weapons are supplied to militarists, the West Berlin newspaper WAHRHEIT notes, it would mean the continuation of the arms race.

The path to a secure world does not lie through the creation of ever new types of weapons, nor through an endless chain of "strings." We cannot allow mankind to take one step after another to the borderline beyond which is nothingness. Life demands

that we agree to begin moving in the opposite direction. As M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his replies to the questions of the UNITA editorial office, this is now a categorical imperative of politics and diplomacy.

In this spirit, the USSR and the other socialist community countries shape their policy. The Soviet Union has put forward specific proposals which ensure the necessary conditions for elaborating mutually acceptable solutions for the entire complex of questions of nuclear and space armaments. Implementation of the proposals by the Warsaw Pact states in Budapest would be a major step on the path to creating a world safe for all. Implementation of the joint proposal of the GDR and the CSSR on the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe and the adoption of the Jaruzelski plan and many other constructive initiatives put forward by the socialist countries could be notable milestones on this path. It is now up to the West. Whether the pernicious chain fettering the solution of the problem of the ending of the arms race and of disarmament is broken depends on it. We cannot allow the historical chance now available for moving to a real reduction of nuclear armaments to be let slip. Political realism must prevail.

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW COMMENTARY VIEWS NATO TALKS ON ZERO OPTION

LD252251 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 25 May 87

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Andrey Ptashnikov; Viktor Lévin commentary]

[Excerpts] A series of spring meetings of the leading military bodies of the North Atlantic alliance began today at the NATO Headquarters near Brussels. The question arises: What have the NATO countries brought to the spring meetings? I shall ask my colleague Viktor Levin to answer this.

[Levin] In my view the question has essentially been put. We shall know on Wednesday the outcome of the meetings in Evere, where the NATO Headquarters is situated. But it is already clear now how they are beginning. Therefore, to analyze the current position means to peep through the curtain into the future. If one refers to the official pronouncements by representatives of the NATO states, it is not difficult to note that all of them support the proposal on the elimination of the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles. No one is in doubt about the zero option on medium-range missiles. That is how it appears according to the official statements. And if there were no "buts" to follow this, one would be able to say that the NATO countries are in favor of a solution of principal importance which paves the way to the elimination of a whole class of nuclear missiles.

That would be possible if there were, indeed, no "buts". However, these "buts" do exist, and that is why the statements, which look attractive, nearly always seem to be a cover for negative attitudes.

I do not want to say that this is the position of the majority. On the contrary: Practically all the NATO countries are categorically in favour of the zero option on medium-range missiles. But these decisions on these questions are taken not by a vote. And that is why today, as the WALL STREET JOURNAL, the organ of U.S. business circles, reports, the NATO representatives in Brussels, who asked for their names not to be mentioned, are saying that statements by Kohl and other arguments coming out of the FRG are a potential obstacle to the reaching an agreement, since the greater part of the arms which are under discussion in Geneva are based on, or directed at, West German territory.

In other words, they are making it clear at NATO Headquarters that Bonn is hindering an agreement. Why? The WALL STREET JOURNAL gives only part of the answer. The rest lies in the fact that the Bundeswehr has Pershing-I missiles at its disposal, and influential circles on the Rhine are anxious to obtain the Pershing-II's, reduced by one stage, in exchange for these missiles. Technically, it is not so difficult to detach this stage, just as, incidentally, it is to set it up from scratch, in order to obtain a new weapon. Thus Bonn is seeking pretexts to get what it wants.

There are some doubts about the question of Bonn's independence. Suffice to recall that it was U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger who put forward the version of adapting the Pershing-I missiles to the shorter-range Pershing-IA. But today it seems to be more important to draw attention to something else, and that is the fact that at a time when the Soviet Union is proposing to embark upon an unprecedented step--the elimination of a whole class of nuclear armaments--on the Rhine they are again obstinately leaning toward another spiral of the arms race. That is the crux of the matter. And that is why it is not a question of details, it is a question of a principled decision--whether to continue and intensify the arms race or to turn it back.

We will see which point of view holds sway at the NATO Headquarters.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S OBUKHOV SEES PROSPECTS FOR FALL INF AGREEMENT

PM280928 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 May 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with USSR Special Envoy A.A. Obukhov, deputy leader of the USSR delegation to the talks on nuclear and space arms by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Kuznetsov: "A. Obukhov: Agreement Can Be Reached by the Fall"; interview is datelined Geneva, date not specified]

[Text] Within the framework of the current round of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms discussions are continuing on the preparation of agreements on these issues. IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Kuznetsov asked Special Envoy A.A. Obukhov, deputy leader of the USSR delegation, to comment on the course of the negotiations.

Geneva -- [Obukhov] In many respects the current, eighth round is the decisive one. The sides are virtually at the point of concluding [storony vplotnuyu podoshli k zaklyucheniyu] a treaty on medium-range missiles in Europe. This is the most "advanced" issue. The Reykjavik meeting was undoubtedly of very great importance for its solution. It was Reykjavik that saw the elaboration of a formula providing for the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe while retaining 100 warheads on such missiles for either side: for the USSR, in the Asian part of our country, and for the United States accordingly -- on its national territory. The task consists in arriving at the legal embodiment of the Reykjavik decisions.

We believe this work must be accomplished within a short period of time. We have agreed with the Americans to conduct matters intensively, without wasting time on recesses between rounds. If things keep moving, then in my view it is entirely possible to expect an agreed draft text of a medium-range missiles treaty to be available by the fall. The draft could be submitted for examination and signing at the next Soviet-U.S. summit meeting [ocherednaya sovetsko-amerikanskaya vstrecha na vysshem urovne].

The conclusion of a medium-range missiles treaty would be of historic importance -- in the full sense of the word. A window would have been cut through into the sphere of real nuclear disarmament. There should be no procrastination. The opportunity which has presented itself to remove medium-range missiles from the nuclear arsenals must not be missed.

[Kuznetsov] Are there any factors still impeding the reaching of agreement?

[Obukhov] On our side -- none. Moreover, the Soviet Union has recently taken a number of exceptionally important steps aimed at eliminating the obstacles which the West has endeavored to erect. Thus, we were told that the linkage of medium-range missiles issues in one single package with strategic and space weapons hinders agreement. These objections were heeded, and the medium-range missiles have now been singled out of the complex of other problems under discussion in Geneva. We were also told that the medium-range missile problem could not be resolved without settling the question of operational and tactical missiles. We also heeded this position of our negotiating partners. On 27 April, seeking to bring the sides' positions together, the USSR delegation submitted a Soviet draft treaty on medium-range missiles which is in the nature of a compromise. Taken together, all this represents a fine foundation for practical movement on agreeing on formulations for inclusion in a joint draft treaty.

Naturally, a considerable amount of work lies ahead. The volume of documents is in itself large. For instance, the U.S. side has so far put on the negotiating table approximately 60 pages of legal text.

But this, of course, is not the main thing. The difficulties at the talks are created by the deliberate one-sidedness inherent in the U.S. draft on several important aspects. Much has been said and written, for instance, about the fact that, instead of eliminating their medium-range missiles in West Europe, the U.S. is insisting on the right to convert [pereoborudovaniye] them into other types of weapons, citing as a pretext the saving of resources. Also overtly inequitable is the U.S. proposal that the United States could, for a prolonged period of time, retain untouched its medium-range missile groupings in West Europe while only the Soviet Union would engage in reductions -- and under the surveillance of U.S. inspectors at that.

Close analysis indicates that the United States is seeking a reductions variant whereby U.S. medium-range missiles -- ballistic and cruise -- could altogether be taken outside the commitment to eliminate them. The Pershing-2s would be converted into Pershing-1Bs, that is, into shorter-range missiles, while the ground-launched cruise missiles would be moved onto ships or would be transformed into conventionally charged means. Moreover, all these possibilities are reserved exclusively for the United States. For the USSR there remains only the one alternative -- destroy the medium-range missiles. It is as if the United States is literally seeking to also push us into converting the medium-range missiles into other forms of SS-20 missile armaments -- intercontinental ballistic missiles, say, or conventionally armed missiles.

Naturally, this path would have nothing in common with the goals of disarmament. As soon as agreement is reached on eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, it must be pursued. Nor is the current U.S. claim to the right to place in Alaska the medium-range missiles remaining for the United States in any way dictated by the interests of reducing the danger of war.

Another example of the unconstructive U.S. approach is the rejection of a ban on new types of medium-range missiles, advocated by the Soviet side. The U.S. position in this respect it formulated in such a way that in effect only the U.S. side would have the right to new types of medium-range missiles, while the USSR would be satisfied only with what it already has.

It is clear that if there is to be constructive progress at the talks it is necessary for the aforementioned obstacles, created by the U.S. approach, to be removed. Time will tell whether the U.S. representatives' statements on their desire for an equal and effective accord will be backed up with concrete deeds.

[Kuznetsov] How difficult are questions of verification?

[Obukhov] The Soviet side attaches great significance to the monitoring of the fulfillment of any commitments adopted. We are in favor of strict, all-embracing verification, up to and including on-site inspections. But it goes without saying that this verification must apply equally to both sides. In this respect attempts by the U.S. side to exempt its own arms from appropriate verification -- through the implementation of reductions by the Soviet side alone in the first years of the treaty's operation -- cannot fail to arouse objections. Nor are matters helped by the overloading of U.S. proposals on verification with various kinds of minor and petty details which have nothing to do with the substance of the issues.

[Kuznetsov] How can the forceful Western press campaign against a possible accord on medium-range missiles be explained?

[Obukhov] Those who are against it cite various arguments, including some which are highly abstruse. They say, for instance, that the "zero option" on medium-range missiles in Europe will knock out a link in the NATO strategy of "flexible response," and then, they say, the system of "nuclear deterrence" will be at an end. But, first, despite the radical nature of the Reykjavik decision on medium-range missiles, it still does not mean the total elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe. That is unfortunate, of course, but it is a fact. Second, the aforementioned arguments confirm yet again that stability and security in the international arena must now be built not along the lines of the policy of strength which urges on the arms race and engenders fear and distrust between peoples, but along the lines of a lowering of the level of military confrontation in all avenues and the strengthening and development of cooperation among states on a peaceful basis. The "balance of nuclear terror" is a very slippery platform. It is possible at any moment to stumble from it into the abyss of a catastrophic war.

I admit that for certain Western politicians it is a difficult and sometimes painful process to break the habit of the old dogmas of nuclear diplomacy, but life will claim its due. Realism will triumph.

Let me add: The board in Western Europe is following hopefully the course of the Geneva talks. Tangible, positive results are expected from the delegations' work. We know this from many meetings with representatives of various organizations, journalists, and politicians who come to Geneva. Let me cite just one example. The USSR mission in Geneva recently received the text of a communique adopted by the Executive Committee of the International Organization of Miners at a session in Bobigny (France). It expressed warm support for the USSR's line of achieving an accord on the elimination in the shortest possible time of all the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles sited in Europe.

[Kuznetsov] Is there any progress in the other two groups at the talks -- on strategic offensive arms and on space?

[Obukhov] You are right to place these two problems together. There is an organic, indissoluble link between strategic offensive arms reductions and limitations in the sphere of space. The spread of the arms race to space would act as a catalyst on the continuation of the arms race on earth. There would simply be no question of radical reductions in strategic offensive arms. Constant reminders must be given of this,

since work continues at an accelerated pace within the framework of the strategic defense initiative in the hope of acquiring for the United States a first-strike potential, that is, achieving military superiority. Of course, the USSR will not permit that.

But we are not in favor of spurring on the military rivalry. An effective accord ensuring the strengthening of the ABM Treaty and creating a reliable barrier to the penetration of strike arms into space would meet everyone's interests. Such an accord would create the necessary conditions for the implementation of the principle -- agreed at the highest level -- of 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms.

The Soviet side at the Geneva talks has submitted a draft "Key Provisions for Agreements" on the questions indicated. Along with a treaty on medium-range missiles, the "key provisions" document could be a subject for approval [predmet dlya utverzhdeniya] at a possible summit meeting.

How did the U.S. delegation respond to this constructive proposal of ours? On the question of strategic offensive arms, it has submitted a draft treaty, albeit an incomplete one with a large number of gaps. Outwardly it reproduces the Reykjavik formula for strategic offensive arms reduction -- to 1,600 ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers, with the number of charges on them being limited to 6,000 units. But here the analogy with Reykjavik basically ends. Thus the U.S. draft says nothing on the question of the limitation of sea-launched long-range cruise missiles. The question of establishing sublimits on ICBM and SLBM warheads is raised once again with a view to wrecking the established structure of the Soviet strategic offensive arms forces. Whereas with a view to achieving a compromise in Reykjavik the Soviet side accepted a reduction by one-half in the number of its heavy ICBM's, now the U.S. proposals are aimed at totally eliminating them. At the same time basically an entirely free hand is ensured for the implementation of U.S. military programs in strategic offensive arms. This alone is enough to demonstrate the unconstructive, one-sided nature of the U.S. approach.

In the sphere of space, the U.S. position looks no better. While agreeing not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 7 years, that is, through 1994, the United States would in effect like to emasculate the very essence of its commitment on this score. In accordance with its approach, during that period any work in the sphere of space-based ABM defense would be permitted, including tests of the corresponding devices in space. That is in direct contradiction to the letter and spirit of the ABM Treaty. After 1994 they propose to us that the ABM Treaty be eliminated entirely.

[Kuznetsov] In light of what has been said, how do the prospects look for work in this round?

[Obukhov] I will not repeat myself. Much work lies ahead, intensive work. We are in favor of progress in all three avenues. But I will say frankly, I pin the greatest hopes on the resolution of the question of medium-range missiles. Here there is a very real possibility of the conclusion of a full-scale treaty in the near future. But to realize that possibility, efforts are needed on both sides. That is to say, on the U.S. side as well.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

CYPRIOT PAPER INTERVIEWS USSR'S KARPOV

NC291046 Nicosia KHARAVYI in Greek 29 May 87 p 5

[Interview with Viktor Karpov, Director of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Department on Arms Limitation and Disarmament, by KHARAVYI, in Nicosia; date not given]

[Text] [KHARAVYI] Comrade Viktor Karpov Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear arms have been taking place in Geneva for some time now. Following Gorbachev's recent proposal on medium-range missiles, both sides issued optimistic statements on the possibility of an agreement this year. However, some backtracking and divergent viewpoints have appeared on the part of the United States and NATO. What is the precise situation currently at the negotiating table?

[Karpov] I believe we should consider certain facts at this point. First, if the proposal we have submitted on medium-range missiles is accepted, it will mean the first true reduction of nuclear weapons in 25 years of talks. It would be a very important event and, naturally, the Americans view it with great attention.

The United States is committed to this issue by NATO's well-known "two-track" decision of 1979. The United States had submitted the "zero-option" plan at that time and thus it is difficult for it to renege now.

On the other hand, the United States already has deployed medium-range missiles in Europe and constructed the appropriate infrastructure. In addition, it is a great temptation for the U.S. military to retain these installations -- generally, the U.S. missile base in Europe.

As for the third part of the triangle, there are the European allies of the United States, some of whom do not walk in tandem with the Americans. We are aware of the statements of the leaders of Spain and other countries who support the conclusion of an agreement on the missile issue. However, we also have had statements from British and French officials which essentially reject the Soviet proposal. All these contradictory positions influence the stance of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks.

Currently, specific documents are on the negotiating table: a Soviet compromise plan and a U.S. plan. Our compromise plan was submitted taking the U.S. plan into account. We took everything possible from it and submitted our own compromise proposal. However, there are points in the U.S. plan that are unacceptable to us. These points precisely reflect what I said before: The U.S. desire to retain its nuclear presence in Europe. The desire is to keep a category of missiles in Europe with a range of 500 to 1,000 km. We have proposed eliminating this type of missile. The Americans insist

on keeping this type and maintaining a balance. They cite this point as a pretext to retain other points in their draft plan; namely, they want to convert the Pershing-2 missiles into Pershing-1B with a range falling within this category. This conversion is very simple and can be made in only 48 hours. All it requires is the removal of one of the missile's two stages and the Pershing-2 becomes a Pershing-1B with the retention of the entire structure.

It is equally simple to again return to the Pershing-2 type missile by adding the second stage. The Americans are thus trying to retain the entire structure -- launching pads, installations, even machine-works for repairs and so forth -- and their nuclear presence in Europe in general but under a different name.

In addition, the Americans want to retain the cruise missiles in their present bases by merely removing the nuclear heads and replacing them with conventional warheads (in this instance it is again easy to replace the nuclear warhead) or to install them on surface ships and submarines. Thus, instead of abolishing nuclear arms, a farce will take place -- they will be kept in a different mode, that is, disarmament will not take place.

With regard to our draft plan, however, we propose to abolish all medium-range missiles -- Pershing-2s, cruise, and SS-20s under strict international control. Control is envisaged for the procedure of final destruction through the presence of our own inspectors at the U.S. bases and of Americans at our own bases. In addition, our plan provides for retaining this verification system even after the missiles are destroyed so that the missiles are not brought back to Europe to either their old bases or to new bases.

[KHARAVYI] There is an impression that the United States is taking advantage of the USSR's declared peace-loving policy to extract concessions, to renege on its positions, and to delay the achievement of true disarmament. What is your comment on this?

[Karpov] This is precisely what appears with regard to the "two-track" decision I mentioned at the beginning. On the one hand, the United States is bound by the NATO decision of 1979 and, on the other, it has a strong desire to retain its nuclear presence in Europe. For instance, the United States submitted a proposal in Reykjavik that envisages the retention of 100 medium-range missiles in Europe by each side, the retention of 100 missiles by us in Asia, and the retention of 100 more on U.S. territory. Mikhail Gorbachev told the United States: All right, we agree to the retention of 100 missiles in the Asian part of the USSR and of 100 on U.S. territory, but we propose their complete elimination in Europe. Reagan agreed. After all, NATO had once approved the zero-option plan. However, when we presented the separate solution for the medium-range missiles on 28 February, the Americans began to vacillate and to haggle so they invented the issue of the 500-1,000 km range missiles.

This, however, is not merely an issue of haggling: rather, it concerns a pretext to retain missiles in Europe because the medium-range involved is 1,000-5,000 km. I would not look upon it as an aim to win something from us but as an intention to keep something of their own. As the issue has now been stated, the discussions revolve around whether the United States is ready to proceed with the reduction and elimination of medium-range missiles or whether it will submit something new to avoid their abolition.

We made a concession when we agreed and proposed to abolish the 500-1,000 km range missiles, because it concerned only our own missiles. Although we have such missiles

in Europe at this moment, the Americans do not. Common logic says this is a concession on our part so the Americans can have no excuse to obstruct a solution of the medium-range missile problem; specifically, their complete elimination from Europe as a type of weapon.

Our consent for the elimination of these missiles foiled the entire U.S. plan to hamper the dismantling of the medium-range missiles. Thus, the conversion of those missiles into short-range missiles has no meaning now. In addition, the argument of the nonexistence of a balance in short-range missiles also is no longer valid.

[KHARAVYI] Comrade Karpov. You have come here to brief Cyprus, a small, nonaligned, nonnuclear country, on the arms control talks being conducted by the two great world powers. I can say Cyprus is honored that the Soviet Union attaches such importance to us. How do you explain the Soviet Government's policy of briefing other countries on the Geneva talks?

[Karpov] I would put it like this: There are no small problems and small roles at the present time. All countries should participate in the disarmament problem and every country's contribution does not depend upon its size but upon its desire to solve these problems.

We believe the better other countries know our position the more certain it is that we shall act because we shall be able to count on their understanding and support.

Currently there are many international forums in which Cyprus and the USSR participate equally and their rights are not defined by the size of their population. As an example, I could cite the recent conference in Cyprus of the European nonaligned and neutral countries. I believe that conference demonstrated the role Cyprus could play to help bring success to the CSCE in Vienna. The Vienna meeting, which is a continuation of the procedure that began in Helsinki in 1975, is an important convocation for strengthening security and cooperation in Europe on the principles expressed in Helsinki as well as for increasing cooperation in the economic and humanitarian sectors; that is, the three "baskets" that were defined at the time.

It is for this reason that we suggest that all 35 states that participate in the CSCE should discuss issues of European security and disarmament, and not only the countries which are members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

[KHARAVYI] I believe Cyprus has one more serious reason why it should be interested in and support disarmament -- the presence of foreign bases and troops on its soil. Furthermore, Cyprus is the only country among those which have signed the Helsinki Final Act whose sovereignty and territorial integrity have been violated despite the principle regarding the inviolability of boundaries on the European Continent. Do you believe the Cyprus case can be raised in these forums where the issues of European security and disarmament are being discussed?

[Karpov] I believe the Cyprus problem is directly linked to the issue of strengthening European security and cooperation. We support the solution of the Cyprus problem at an international conference. We always have supported the need to solve the Cyprus problem through peaceful means in a way that will guarantee the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and unity of the Cyprus Republic. I believe strengthening European security, disarmament, and implementing measures of trust in Europe will help bring about a solution of the Cyprus problem.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS REPORT ON 27 MAY REAGAN COMMENTS ON PROGRESS OF TALKS

PM290957 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 May 87 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Reagan Interview"]

[Excerpt] Washington, 28 May--U.S. President R. Reagan gave an interview on Wednesday to a group of television journalists from Western Europe, Canada, and Japan.

Answering a question by correspondents on how close the USSR and the United States are to reaching an agreement on the removal of medium-range missiles from Europe, Reagan said the United States has been holding "lively consultations with the allies" on this issue. "A general consensus appears to have been reached," he added, "on the basic terms of what we are discussing."

"I believe," Reagan continued, "that considerable progress has been made, greater progress than at any time since World War II, and that we now have a more favorable opportunity to set about reducing nuclear arms than ever before." "I would like to hope that we will eventually succeed in eliminating all nuclear arms in the world," he added.

At this point, however, the President emphasized that the Washington administration has "no plans to completely remove nuclear arms from Europe," as this would supposedly allow the Soviet Union to retain its alleged "considerable superiority in conventional arms." The head of the White House also made it clear that his administration still has no intention of giving up work on the "Star Wars" program.

Reagan admitted he is concerned by the increased authority and influence of the USSR and the Soviet leadership in Western Europe. This, as the press emphasizes, is directly linked to the Soviet Union's extensive peace initiatives. However, he made the unsubstantiated claim in this respect that "the United States must have greater credibility than the Soviet Union."

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: CHANCES FOR, IMPORTANCE OF INF AGREEMENT VIEWED

OW300603 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0301 GMT 30 May 87

['Studio 9' program presented by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, Soviet television and radio political observer, with Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, and Academician Vitaliy Iosifovich Goldanskiy, prominent Soviet scientist in the field of chemical and nuclear physics and Lenin Prize laureate]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello, comrades. We are meeting once again in Studio 9 at the Ostankina Television Center. Our monthly broadcast is devoted to discussing pressing international problems. I wish to begin our talk by introducing the participants of today's talk: Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, and Academician Vitaliy Iosifovich Goldanskiy, a prominent Soviet scientist, specialist in the field of chemical and nuclear physics, and Lenin Prize laureate.

We are now living through an unusual time, although it is possible that as the result of the daily hustle and bustle of life, not all of us realize this or comprehend it. You might remember that Yesenin once said: Face-to-face you see nothing -- distance is required to see the whole picture. I am assuming that because there is hardly any distance, we do not always fully realize the scope of the events we witness, and at times even those in which we participate. At the same time, it is quite possible that the newspaper headlines that we all read everyday may well become lines in history textbooks that our children and grandchildren will be studying.

Primarily, I refer to the arms limitations talks that are presently taking place in Geneva -- particularly those on medium-range missiles. Perhaps some of you feel that this is being exaggerated -- that the event is surely important, but hardly historical. I think that this is not being exaggerated, and this is why: Certainly, the elimination of medium-range missiles, which are very powerful weapons -- if this can be achieved -- is in itself important. But perhaps this in itself is not the main thing. The main thing is that an event would have taken place that would be unprecedented in human history: Arms have been stockpiled since the cave man -- perhaps starting with stone axes, then swords, spears, and arrows -- up to ballistic missiles. The number of weapons has always increased. Now we have reached the point where not only is the question of limiting the arms race being discussed, but turning the clock back, the first step to disarmament, is also being discussed: the destruction of one type of arms.

If this were to take place it would obviously be an event of extraordinary importance. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, speaking recently in Bucharest, emphasized that the

Soviet Union is making maximum efforts to meet the other side and has taken their wishes and interests, first and foremost including the medium-range missiles, into consideration. I think that it would be worthwhile to begin today's talk with a question directed to you, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. The question is this: How do you appraise the current situation at the Geneva talks, in particular those about medium-range missiles, and what are the changes that this time it will be possible to reach agreement?

[Bessmertnykh] I think that, behind the scene that you just spoke about, a great deal of intensive effort has gone into the work of the Geneva conference -- above all that of the Soviet delegation. The scheduled Geneva conference has already been going on for a month. At the center of the two delegations' work are questions relating to a solution on medium-range missiles. You are quite correct here.

However, our delegation is working simultaneously in all of the three main directions that were designated in Geneva at the very start: That is, strategic weapons remain -- as before -- a problem of vital interest to us, and we are striving there for progress. There is also the question of space. These two problems are interdependent.

Nevertheless, events have brought the question of medium-range missiles to the surface, making it one of the problems that is likely to be solved first. Therefore -- as they was -- like it or not, we are speaking more about this topic and more effort is being made on this issue.

What, then -- briefly -- is the situation today? Two draft agreements have been placed on the table: A draft that was proposed by the Americans, which has been thoroughly studied by the Soviet side, and a draft proposed by us, which takes many of the positions in the U.S. document into consideration. In effect, this is a compromise document -- that is, not only does it contain our thoughts, but the ideas of our partner in the talks have been considered.

Over the past few weeks there has been a comparison of the text and approaches, many questions have been asked of each side, and literally a few days ago both sides agreed to begin work on a third joint draft agreement, so to speak. This is not a bad development in our delegations' work, but, at the same time, it does not as yet indicate a decisive step forward, since there still remain a number of serious disagreements -- a number of basic differences between the two sides' positions.

If we are to speak about these differences, the U.S. side will not agree that the U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe should be destroyed or dismantled, as we wish and upon which we insist. They still envisage the possibility that these medium-range missiles could be reequipped into some different type of missiles -- specifically, into operational and tactical missiles that is, missiles with a reduced range. Should this happen, the Soviet Union would destroy its own missiles or dismantle them -- we propose two options to the solution of this question -- whereas the U.S. side would simply change the labels, and even though these would be only slightly different forms of the missiles, they would remain in Europe. Therefore, this position definitely does not suit us.

The U.S. position on the methods of reducing and eliminating these missiles also does not suit us: Their position contains a trick that would place the Soviet side at a disadvantage -- that is, the problem of the so-called nonsynchronized reduction and elimination of missiles. The Americans would like the following: The Soviet Union would start destroying its missiles, while the Americans would observe, carefully and

with great pleasure. A certain period of time would elapse, and finally -- say, in a year or 2 -- the U.S. side would tell us that it is joining our efforts, and then the synchronized reduction of missiles would begin. Well, obviously, we cannot allow this pleasure to ourselves -- and especially not to the U.S. side. There are also a number of basic differences, which require careful study and very serious efforts.

Therefore, summing up the answer to your question on the chances today, this is how I would put it: The possibilities for reaching agreement on medium-range missiles do exist, but whether these possibilities will turn into an actual agreement is hard to say. We will have to wait and see.

[Zorin] The answer is somewhat diplomatic, but that is your profession, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich.

Let us imagine for a minute that a medium-range missile agreement will be reached. Would the significance of this agreement not be exaggerated? I mean the following: Even after the elimination of medium-range missiles, if this should happen, more than enough nuclear weapons to destroy all that is living on this Earth several times over would remain. Is that not the case, Vitaliy Losifovich?

[Goldanskiy] Yes, it is. Unfortunately, that is the case: The following figures could be mentioned: We are talking about eliminating or dismantling 735 delivery vehicles -- from both sides...

[Zorin, interrupting] You mean medium-range missiles?

[Goldanskiy] Yes. If we were to compare this with the number of strategic delivery vehicles, then this number is 4,700. Clearly, we are talking about a small part of the whole. Even more striking is the comparison of the number of nuclear warheads that are on the medium-range missiles: The combined total of both sides is 1,221, and the total number of such weapons of various kinds placed on delivery vehicles in Europe is 6,000. In other words, we are talking about 20 percent of what is available in Europe. If we were to speak about the stockpiles around the world, including those in the arsenals, then it is estimated that this number would be between 50,000 and 60,000. Therefore, the figure is reduced to two percent. It appears that this really is very little.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to overestimate the significance of this step, because it would be the first time that we would have turned back the clock. The first time, starting with attempts -- not always successful -- to somehow limit the growth of arms to disarmament. Here it becomes obvious that he who walks this path will succeed. Therefore, it is difficult to overestimate the value of the first step along this path. I would compare it to a supersaturated solution: Dropping a single crystal into it is enough to cause the crystallization of the whole solution to take place immediately. It has to be started. Therefore, we have the image of a chain reaction, which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev made use of in his speech in Bucharest when he spoke about the need to begin the process of disarmament, from which a chain reaction would follow, as would the hope of mankind. In my opinion, this correctly reflects the essence of the matter, as well as our hopes.

[Zorin] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, can you add something to this?

[Bessmertnykh] Well, I can only say the following regarding how thoroughly the significance of this step has been pictured. After all, it is not only a step encompassing military strategic goals, nor is it only a step leading to a lessening of confrontation in Europe -- although essentially it is in fact very important political step that gives mankind the opportunity to begin divorcing itself from nuclear weapons and to become accustomed to new processes, processes leading to their reduction.

It is quite right. Up to now we have concluded fairly good treaties and agreements in this sphere, but as with any initial steps, they were understandably limited. We established various ceilings, various limitations -- including qualitative ones. Nevertheless, despite these agreements and treaties -- take SALT I and SALT II, for example -- the number of nuclear warheads, in particular, continued to grow sharply. Despite the existence of these treaties, we now have more warheads than we had in the past. This is why the new agreement on intermediate-range missiles that is being studied [prorabatyvayetsya] will be a breakthrough of extremely great importance, and its significance cannot be overestimated in any way. It is genuinely essential and it would be very good if the Western side would share in the understanding of its significance.

[Zorin] Now we are talking about reducing the U.S. and Soviet nuclear potentials. At the same time, in the West there is a segment of popular opinion that holds that the existence of this nuclear potential is precisely a factor promoting peace, a deterrent factor. Our television viewers had the opportunity to hear this concept expressed quite recently by Margaret Thatcher, the British prime minister, who appeared here on Soviet television. Vitaliy Iosifovich, you are a specialist, a physicist. What can you say about this theory that has become quite popular in the West?

[Goldanskiy] Well, in the past the underlying factor of the nuclear deterrence theory held that a potential aggressor was deterred by fear of retribution from a retaliatory nuclear strike. It played a certain stabilizing role. As a matter of fact, this factor appeared for the first time, as you know, in 1949 when the United States lost its monopoly on the possession of nuclear weapons. I think that now it has become completely outdated, and one of the most obvious differences of the new political thinking compared with the old is a result of this.

Now I see the following basic arguments to prove this proposition concerning the self-created obsolescence of the factor of nuclear deterrence: First is the fact that in the past 40 years a nuclear superarmament [sverkhvooruzhennost] has occurred. A figure of 50,000 to 60,000 warheads already has been mentioned; that is a total of some 10,000 megatons, or, in other words, 2 metric tons of explosives per capita, including infants and old people. Second, the bankruptcy of the concept of victory in a nuclear war has been scientifically proven, along with the bankruptcy of the idea that local nuclear conflicts will inevitably become global conflicts. This is why we must address here the logic of development that ultimately leads to global nuclear conflict. This has been proven scientifically. We must recall the nuclear winter, that nuclear war will lead to the destruction of civilization, the destruction of mankind, and even possibly the destruction of the biosphere as a whole.

There is not just a real danger of mutual nuclear destruction of mankind now, but also the danger of nuclear suicide. This is sufficient reason to explode all available nuclear stockpiles in the country [na domu]. This kind of global explosion of all stockpiles is sometimes called the Doomsday Machine, and those who conduct the explosion die instantaneously while the rest are doomed to a slow and agonizing death. This is the second point.

The third point is that against a background of such nuclear superarmament, the fate of mankind has now been over entrusted to computers. Now under these conditions we, who live in a world of probabilities, have essentially been denied the right to make a mistake. Just remember, a sapper can only make one mistake. Now the entire world has been placed in this situation.

Here I can cite some curious figures. For example, when the computer software for SDI, the notorious Strategic Defense Initiative, was being assessed, it was noted that it was necessary to have 100 million lines of computer programming without a single error. An error in this is fraught with the danger of an explosion, the beginning of a nuclear war, not a premediated war.

An equivalent to this would be a library with 5,000 books of 300 pages each in which there are no typographical errors, not even one of punctuation. Besides, these books would be published without any proofreading.

Now in this situation, under the influence of these three circumstances, I repeat that I think, the nuclear deterrence factor has become outdated. Nuclear deterrence, in my opinion, must be replaced by a fairly lengthy new stage of mutual deterrence based on the strictest mutual verification and inspection. Now a most important and decisive role in this mutual verification and inspection must be played by contemporary science permit reliable--completely reliable--verification?

[Zorin] Vitaliy Iosifovich, do the possibilities of contemporary science permit reliable -- completely reliable -- verification?

[Goldanskiy] Well, I could cite several examples, but I will limit myself to two. Here I will limit myself to examples of how our Earth is seen from space. [Goldanskiy holds up a page with four diagrams which depict with successive clarity the outlines of a tank viewed from above] Here on these few pictures you can see how gradually the details of an image of a tank seen from space emerge. This occurs as the spatial resolution of various sensors and probes, which register what occurs on Earth from space, is magnified and improved. If at fairly early stages in the development of these methods this was simply some kind of rectangular figure without any meaning, now gradually it becomes visible as a very clear image of a tank.

[Zorin] This can be seen from space?

[Goldanskiy] It can be seen from space. Now according to the latest information we have about a special reconnaissance satellite -- if we talk about the Americans for instance -- called Keyhole-11, we are talking about a resolution capability of 5-10 centimeters from a distance of 500 miles or 800 km. This is about 10 to the minus 7th power in relation to the distance of the object being observed compared to the distance over which the observation is being made.

[Zorin] Put this more simply.

[Goldanskiy] Very well, I will do so. This is 5 centimeters observed from a distance of 500 km. [distance as heard]

[Zorin] I understand.

[Goldanskiy] But this is not all. I would like to cite another example. The Americans conducted an underground nuclear explosion on 10 April 1986 in Nevada. Its codename was Mighty Oak, although the Oak turned out to be less mighty than expected and the explosion was much less powerful. Instead of 20 kilotons or more, the power of the explosion amounted to only 1.3 kilotons. Nevertheless, this explosion was registered perfectly well at our seismic observatory in Obninsk. In other words, it was not possible to conceal it in this case. We know of other examples when explosions that were not officially announced were later revealed in statements from our side. Essentially we are now in fact living in a communal apartment with all the consequences that stem from this.

[Zorin] Now there is talk -- I want to continue this topic -- that atomic weapons are such a frightening thing that mankind is afraid to start a war. If you remove atomic weapons, conventional arms will remain and what we had before will begin immediately, that is, they will go for each other's throat. There is much talk in this regard about the superiority of the Warsaw pact countries in the sphere of conventional arms and this serves as justification for slowing down the process of eliminating nuclear arms. Is this so, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich?

[Bessmertnykh] First, let me say something about claims that there have been no wars because of a fear of nuclear arms. It seems to me that on the surface here everything looks nominally convincing, but in actual fact this is indeed purely a nominal coincidence. For 40 years there were no wars, for 40 years there have been nuclear weapons; therefore, there were no wars because of the existence of nuclear weapons. The fact that these two things are concurrent does not mean that evidence of a relationship between them exists, so to speak.

I consider that nuclear war has not occurred not because nuclear weapons exist, but precisely in spite of the fact that nuclear weapons exist. Possibly it is just a coincidence that it has not occurred and has not been a regularity, insofar as the deterrence that Vitaliy Iosifovich described in such an interesting way is fraught with enormous lethal danger for a number of reasons. I would like to mention some of them.

First of all, there is malicious intent which we cannot ignore, not only because of a breakdown in a computer or a technical fault, although this, too, must be kept in mind. Why can we not ignore malicious intent? History gives the answer. Many facts have already been revealed which show that American military planners, or the military-political bureaucracy of the United States as they say, actively planned nuclear strikes.

[Zorin, interrupting] The famous (Pincher) plan about which we now hear.

[Bessmertnykh] The (Pincher) plan and others. Recently I read the work of an American researcher. He provides 19 documented instances when nuclear strikes were specifically planned by U.S. military forces. Moreover, what makes it particularly interesting -- I will get to my main thought in a second -- is that most of these instances took place at the time when we did not as yet have military strategic parity. In my opinion, the greatest deterrent factor -- which from our side was an historical achievement -- was the appearance of military strategic parity. It is precisely the presence of this parity -- and not just because of the existence of nuclear weapons and warhead delivery vehicles -- that was and still is the stabilizing factor in the world.

I wish to add to the theme that you introduced. What would happen if all nuclear weapons disappeared? Will everyone resort to conventional wars? In the first place

conventional wars are already taking place, unfortunately even with the presence of nuclear weapons. All of us can recall the wars that have taken place since World War II and, unfortunately, even now there is a conventional war between Iran and Iraq.

The West says that the East -- that is, the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact -- maintains superiority in conventional weapons and, therefore, perhaps this so-called imbalance should be dealt with, followed by nuclear disarmament. The fact of the matter is that this theory is not supported by any facts, nor can it be substantiated because in fact this is not the case. If we were to take the European situation -- we are now speaking specifically about Europe and all the pseudo-specialists always give Europe as an example when they speak about the conventional superiority of the East -- then here there is no general superiority. There is no imbalance here. Certainly, in specific areas of this equation there are some instances of an imbalance or a degree of asymmetry. Say, in some forms of weapons the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact maintain a lead, that is, they might have more of a certain type of weapon -- tanks, for example, or artillery. In other types of arms, combined NATO and U.S. military forces in Europe maintain superiority, say in the air force. Therefore, taken as a whole, there is a balance here in conventional arms. All those who say that this is not the case are simply making use of this theory to slow down the whole process of limiting and reducing weapons.

[Goldanskiy] I wish to add a couple of words on this. With the aid of verification means what I discussed earlier -- that is, information received from space -- the possibility that conventional weapons might be used to start a war can be subjected to verification just as one started with nuclear weapons can be. Consequently, the possibility of a surprise attack like the one that occurred on 22 June 1941 is presently precluded. Therefore, it is pure speculation to suggest that the Warsaw Pact forces could launch a surprise attack on West Europe under the present universal means of verification we now have available.

[Zorin] This speculation is directed at a poorly informed audience. Let us return, however, to the talks now taking place in Geneva and which are the topic of our conversation.

We are now saying that an agreement can be reached there. Not so long ago, however, the very idea of destroying even a fraction of the existing nuclear missile potentials was in the realm of science fiction or some other fiction. Now it is a realistic item on an agenda which diplomats are discussing at the negotiating tables. What has changed? Why is it that today this agreement is viewed as a political reality whereas quite recently this was seen as mere fiction?

[Bessmertnykh] Perhaps, most importantly, it is a consequence of the objective fact that there are simply too many of this type of weapon around. The more we stockpile these weapons, the clearer we see their danger. This undoubtedly is the case. We must keep in mind that there are reasonable people both in our country and in the West. There are wonderful specialists who -- with a pencil in hand, or these days with a computer in hand -- are demonstrating that it is simply no longer possible to continue to exist under the shadows of huge nuclear arsenals. Anything can happen all too quickly. The perfection of weapons has led to the growth of dangers. I think that this is an objective fact.

Second, the Soviet Union -- which for a long time systematically pursued a solution to these questions -- has recently put forward a number of serious proposals which lead to such an outcome. Why did this take place if not because of the wish to eliminate this threat? It reflects a comprehension of the contemporary world, a new way of thinking that has allowed us to see the world as it really is, without illusions, without aggrandizement or disparagement. It is a complex but interdependent world. Therefore, we arrived at a new concept of security which radically differs from that which existed until now over the past millenia. We are now saying: We do not want the level of U.S. security to be lower than that of the Soviet Union. This is a totally new approach and a new way of thinking, because if they were to have a lower level of security -- or conversely if the Soviet Union was to have a lower level of security -- then a destabilizing situation would occur in which the other side, the one finding itself at a disadvantage, would aspire to restore the balance. And the arms race begins.

Therefore, these new approaches -- new USSR proposals -- which go to the heart of the matter, are opening up such possibilities. Also, there is the obvious fact that the world is simply tired of the confrontations and the dangers with which it has to live. We are feeling an ever-increasing growth in support for the Soviet proposals from all sides -- different parties, countries, movements, states, and political figures. In other words, history itself has included the problem on the agenda and it is to the credit of the Soviet leadership that it captured this mood and understood the necessity of solving this problem and reinforced this trend with specific, practical proposals.

[Zorin] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, would it be correct to say that what you are saying could be interpreted to mean that both sides, including the Soviet Union, have renounced some of their previous positions, have reexamined these positions, made corrections and changes to them, and now approach them differently? Could this be so?

[Bessmertnykh] I think that against the background of a consistent course towards nuclear disarmament, the positions and tactics of political struggle undoubtedly are being perfected. Some things become obsolete, others come to the fore, and possibly some decisions are not correct. Since the Soviet Union is engaged in this search and its diplomacy is actively seeking solutions, it is possible that at times the paths that seem at one time to offer a solution, do not seem to be quite so at some point later.

Although, on the whole, I emphasize, the line we took on this matter has been very consistent. As far as tactical decisions are concerned, then certainly there have been evolutionary changes in these positions. Additionally, there has been that which I already noted: a certain important qualitative evolution in terms of concepts. This has led to our new strategic view of peace and the approaches to the solution of global problems. Therefore, taken as a whole, all this gives us a new stage, so to speak, in the struggle for nuclear disarmament.

I understand from the way you formed the question that perhaps it was a mistake, so to speak, or perhaps this was not quite the right way to do it.

[Zorin] That is quite right.

[Bessmertnykh] You know, in diplomacy, unlike some domestic matters, it is very difficult to assess the consequences of various steps. If, for example, in agriculture we are unhappy about the present state of affairs, we can blame only ourselves or perhaps the heavens and natures. On the other hand, in matters of foreign policies,

when we are planning a certain move or line or a political course, we must, in our minds, relate to it to the reactions and counterreactions or cooperation resulting from this line. It is very difficult to correctly assess the interaction of any particular line and the consequent reaction or cooperation from partners on the international arena. More so, since there are very many of them, the added difficulty lies in the fact that the reactions are neither stable nor constant; they also change, depending on domestic, foreign and other conditions. In any case, our line is such that we do not consider that every step taken is correct. Mikhail Sergeyevich said on numerous occasions that historians will possibly find excuses to be critical of some of our decisions. Mistakes can be made by those who seek solutions. The main thing is that we have made no mistake in the central, fundamental course toward nuclear disarmament, on ensuring the security of the Soviet Union through military, political, or diplomatic means. That was the main goal and it determined the path.

[Zorin] Well, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, you spoke about some corrections and changes in our position that have created possibilities for agreement. I think that it would be only fair and objective to say that similar corrections and changes can be seen in Washington's position as well. Let us take for example, the foreign policy concept of Washington's position in 1981 and compare it to the current concepts. The differences, of course, are huge. Changes are taking place and there are more sensible approaches on a number of questions in the U.S. positions and the reasons for these are several. Many could be named, but I wish to briefly discuss two main reasons. One of the reasons in the changes in Washington's line is to be found in the fact that Reagan's presidency is coming to an end. He only has 1 and 1/2 years remaining. If this is viewed from U.S. reality, then there is even significantly less time, because that last year of any presidency -- when the struggle for the next presidency is unfolding -- is a year when serious and far-reaching steps in the area of foreign policy are usually not taken by Washington.

Therefore, the President has very little time left, whereas the balance of the current administration is not favorable either in domestic matters or, particularly, in foreign policy matters. This could, however unpleasant this would be for the President who would like to leave something positive behind -- and an important agreement with the Soviet Union in the area of disarmament would certainly be that and would certainly be an asset -- prove to be a dead weight to the present Republican ruling party at the elections in the fall next year. That is why there is a desire to reach or achieve something.

The second reason is of an economic nature. The United States now feels the heavy burden of the arms race. Although there is no crisis in the American economy, there are certain related factors that must be taken into consideration. These include a steep decline in the position of the United States on the world market and the fact that the United States is being pressured both by Japan and West Europe. Leading specialists indicate both are directly connected with the burden of the arms race and military expenditures. Additionally, influential monopolies, which are not Pentagon contractors, are acting on the basis of more sensible assessments, and demand more reasonable approaches from Washington. All this is particularly being reflected in the position toward the problems under discussion in Geneva.

In connection with the problems we are discussing, I would like to put a question to you, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich: Let us hope, after all, that it will be possible to reach an agreement in Geneva. How will events develop and what will happen, however, if an agreement is not signed -- particularly on medium-range missiles -- in the coming months or in the near future?

[Bessmertnykh] We, of course, cannot exclude such a scenario, although we are now enjoying a solely favorable moment, when the interests of the Soviet Union, the United States, and West Europe coincide at the same time and in the same point. If we miss this opportunity, we will leave this point, like extensions of parallel lines, and go off into the distance. It will be necessary to look again for a moment in history when concluding an agreement will be both needed and possible.

The solution of the issue of medium-range missiles, as we have said, is the most likely one to achieve promising results. The specific character of the moment is the fact that many shades of U.S. political thought are pointed in this direction; it seems that the President is inclined toward this, too. So, there are very many factors pointing to the possibility of such an agreement. This, however, may not happen. The agreement may remain out of reach, because, in general, a trend not to enter agreements of this kind has been prevalent in Washington, even when there were practicable possibilities in this respect.

What will happen, however, if this occurs? Well, there will be no agreement. Yes, one of the chances to raise our relations with the United States to higher levels will be missed, but the struggle will not stop at that. We will continue the search for agreement; we will search for new agreements...

[Zorin, interrupting] I want us to answer now some questions asked by our television viewers in their letters, in particular two urgent questions. Here is one of them: Tremendous expenses and enormous efforts were spent to create the military nuclear potentials. Does regret about the money and efforts spent not hinder the process of nuclear disarmament? This pertains to the sphere of psychology, but psychology plays a great role in politics, indeed.

[Bessmertnykh] Well, this is not a simple question. But I think in order to answer it we should ask ourselves an additional question: What was this money spent for, these millions, and billions? It was spent to strengthen the defensive ability and security of the Soviet Union. The same thing relates, apparently, to other countries, but let us speak about ourselves, about our own side. This is the first thing. The expenses undertaken to strengthen our security undoubtedly have played and are still playing a role. A question arises: If we start disarming, are we not going to feel sorry for these missiles and excellent military systems that have been created? Well, if on the other hand we do not do it, then in addition to the sum of N billions spent up to this date, we shall continue to spend N plus 1 billion, and, in this way, we shall not gain anything economically.

The reduction in missiles we are discussing -- so far we have been speaking only about missiles, but there are many other weapons, including strategic ones, which we have not touched upon, in particular in Europe -- then, naturally, we shall not be undertaking these expenses, and they will be allocated to other needs.

I think the matter here lies in the fact that one should not approach security problems commercially, although our country undoubtedly is experiencing a restructuring and every ruble, as they say, must be accounted for. A ruble invested in defense sensibly and rationally, however, guarantees this restructuring by the conditions created by these means -- by the favorable international situation. Diplomacy and defense act hand in hand in this situation.

[Zorin] Vitaliy Iosifovich, there is a related question in the letters: Is it possible to use nuclear warheads for peaceful needs when the missiles are destroyed; is it possible to avoid wasting them?

[Goldanskiy] Unquestionably, yes. Now we are directly starting scientific discussions on this topic, in particular with our U.S. colleagues. Our delegation was in Washington recently and this question was among those topics discussed. Well, if we just have a look at the quantities of the energy accumulated in the form of nuclear weapons of all kinds, one could say that it would be sufficient to supply all reactors of all nuclear power stations in the world for 1, or 2, or 3 years. The question is how to do it practically.

I will not dwell on the problem of how to dismantle warheads -- this procedure is a separate topic for discussion. Let us suppose that we have done this and extracted these explosive nuclear warheads. There are several possibilities that can also be discussed separately. There is one possibility in which the charges of weapons-grade uranium 235 or plutonium are used to enrich natural uranium or depleted uranium, in order to use it as a nuclear fuel for existing nuclear reactors. This is the simplest and the most rapidly implementable way. There is another version, which was considered recently by French scientists. This concerns creating new types of reactors that work on molten salts. By including these molten salts, or thorium fluorides, in the energy cycle, thorium can be used together with uranium. This is of special interest in particular to some Third World countries, for example, it can be interesting for India and Brazil. This project is, undoubtedly, also worth consideration, but it is a relatively longer-term one; and it requires the creation of new reactors. In any case, it can be simply said that in this case it is undoubtedly possible to beat swords into plowshares, and it is within the abilities of our country's scientists, and scientists of other countries.

[Zorin] Thank you; this is very interesting. It is even more so for the reason that this question is either not discussed or discussed very little. There is another question in the letters of our television viewers that I want to address to you, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. Suppose an agreement on medium-range missiles is signed in Geneva; let us hope that will happen. Is it possible that the story of the SALT II treaty will be repeated; that is, that it will be signed, but later the U.S. Senate will not ratify it?

[Bessmertnykh] That is also possible. I think that one cannot rule this out either. Unfortunately, the United States has shown itself to be not a very reliable partner. Treaties and agreements have been concluded several times between our countries, but the United States either has not ratified them, or has not carried them out. It is a problem. We should proceed from the fact that the United States, as a state, must guarantee the implementation and ratification of concluded agreements.

We cannot accept as justification any reference to their internal political struggle, to the fact that Democrats do not like the things done by Republicans and vice versa, or liberals do not like the things done by conservatives, and so on. We deal with the United States, and with the administration which is in power at the moment; and we base our calculations on it guaranteeing its international agreements. This is the way it is and always was supposed to be done.

[Zorin] I do not know whether you will agree with me or not. I wish to add a consideration and ask your opinion. The distribution of forces in the Senate -- the real distribution of forces -- is now somewhat different from the one that existed at the time ratification of SALT II was discussed; and the frame of mind of the voters, which must be taken into consideration by senators on the eve of national elections, is such that the analogy with the situation that existed at the moment the ratification of the SALT II treaty was discussed, is not quite right.

[Bessmertnykh] You are quite right. The historical moments are absolutely different, but there is a fact that makes one take notice. We know examples of the Senate adopting negative decisions, or not making any decision, in connection with events which bore no relation to the treaty whatsoever. Those who opposed the treaties and agreements sometimes managed to change the frame of mind of the Senate and of public opinion.

[Zorin] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, I know that quite recently you visited Washington and met and held talks with officials of the administration. What is your impression? Is the administration now talking with one voice, particularly on questions that we are discussing today, or are there serious differences in Washington? Is there a struggle, a clash of opinions that can particularly influence the Geneva talks?

[Bessmertnykh] During my talks in Washington, the administration naturally spoke to me through the voice of Shultz and his assistants; it was with them that I met. The U.S. Administration is particularly averse to the topic of dissension in its ranks as far as various foreign policy questions are concerned, although this topic is constantly being discussed by the U.S. and world press.

We have facts confirming that the administration has difficulty in reaching decisions on many issues, particularly those relating to the sphere of Soviet-U.S. relations, because there is such an obvious difference in opinions there. For understandable reasons I will not categorize the administration figures -- that is, who stands on the black or white squares -- in this regard. However, nobody disputes the fact that not everything there is smooth.

However, I would like to stress one detail: We are not formulating our policy in relation to the United States on the basis of these differences. It would be foolish if we tried to structure our diplomatic approaches to the solution of various questions on the basis of the existence of these differences or, as the Americans say, tried to exploit them. Now we know about the existence of these differences and naturally we watch them. Our policy towards the United States, however, is built on more principled and reliable grounds than the vacillating views and opinions that exist in Washington. This, as a matter of fact, is the case during the election campaign period and during the elections themselves. There is a lot of talk that we can wager on one side or the other, but we have never done this, since this would be simply politically senseless and foolish. Soviet policy is not made in this way.

[Zorin] Thank you. To conclude our discussion today, I would like to ask both of you a question.

The following concept has recently become widespread in the West -- supposedly the Soviet idea on creating a nuclear free world by the year 2000 is a wonderful, attractive, and noble idea but that it is a utopian idea. That is, it is impossible to achieve this. Much is being said and written about this. Our television viewers may remember that not so long ago here in our Studio 9, British Minister Timothy Renton expounded on this kind of concept. Vitaliy Iosifovich, as a scientist and physicist, what can you say about this?

[Goldanskiy] Yes, indeed, Timothy Renton said that it is impossible to turn back the discovery of the wheel. This is not the issue, however; we are talking not about rejecting the discovery of the wheel, but about how that discovery will be used. A nuclear-free world is not a world without nuclear energy, it is a world without nuclear weapons. I recall from my childhood years the Disarmament Committee of the League of

Nations, and this was a very clear example at the time of the utopian nature and uselessness of good intentions. Now what has changed? Aleksandr Aleksandrovich has already said something about this. Why is this no longer utopian, this first practical step toward disarmament in the entire history of mankind and the subsequent -- as we hope -- chain reaction?

What has changed is the fact that the scientific and technical revolution of the second half of the 20th century has occurred. For the first time it has, on the one hand, placed before mankind the real question of to be or not to be, and, at the same time, it has created real -- and I stress this, too -- opportunities for the strictest mutual verification and inspection. Now this is a prerequisite for disarmament.

Valentin Sergeyevich, at the beginning you recalled the poetry of Yesenin. In connection with this, regarding the scientific and technical revolution, I would like to recall what Mayakovskiy once said about revolution. He said: Curse you thrice, the easy life; and glorify thrice my blessed burden [tebe obyvatelskoye, bud trizhdy proklyato, i moe (?poedogo) trizhdy slavsya blagoslovennoye]. Now I would like to stress that science, when utilized correctly, is the greatest blessing of mankind, although this is sometimes forgotten today.

[Zorin] What about the political point of view, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich?

[Bessmertnykh] I think we are often faced with a situation where a thought or idea ahead of the current level of consciousness is declared utopian. I feel that there are those who think that way deliberately; some intentionally dress our ideas and plans in utopian clothes. The fact of the matter is that to check whether an idea is utopian or not, practical steps in realizing it must be undertaken. If the plan proposed by the Soviet Union is practicable -- if it is possible for the proposed measure to be realized -- then certainly this is not utopian.

What was proposed on 15 January 1986, namely the plan for nuclear disarmament, only sounds utopian because we have not as yet become accustomed to the possibility of its realization. We are getting used to it, however. Those steps that the Soviet Union is proposing in the area of medium-range missiles, in strategic offensive arms, and in the area of solving space problems, are affirming the reality of achieving this main goal.

We are not utopians. We are realists. Our policies are built precisely on this basis. I think that in time this truth will be realized in terms of agreements and treaties, and those who are present here tonight will witness their signing.

[Zorin] I think that what both of you spoke about bears witness to a conflict between the entrenched thinking -- formed over the centuries -- toward which the present level of human development is pushing us, toward a new way of thinking. The conflict is inevitable. In conclusion, the following example can be used: Only recently it was thought that the idea of destroying a part of the nuclear arsenal was impossible. Today it is on the agenda and on the negotiating table at the Geneva talks. The Soviet Union and the socialist countries are now demonstrating samples of the new thinking -- thinking on the level of the reality of our times.

Just recently, at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in Berlin, the resolution of socialist countries to rid mankind of the threat of nuclear destruction was once again reaffirmed. This is not just another document; it is an expression of a political trend which is continually increasing its influence on the development of the political process in the contemporary world.

I think this is where we will end our discussion today and thank our television viewers for their attention. Thank you very much for participating in our talk, and until we meet again here in Studio 9, thank you.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S PETROVSKIY CRITICIZES NATO ATTEMPTS AT 'LINKAGE'

LD312011 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1700 GMT 31 May 87

["The Week" program; no video available]

[Excerpts] [Presenter] At the Berlin session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee the organization's disarmament proposals to date were confirmed and further initiatives were also taken. [passage omitted] Alajos Chrudinak spoke in Moscow to Vladimir Petrovskiy, Soviet deputy foreign minister, about the topical disarmament issues.

[Begin recording] [Chrudinak] A few weeks ago it still seemed that only a few steps separated us from the conclusion of the agreement connected with the elimination, annihilation, of medium-range missiles. But time passes and there is still no agreement. What is the situation? What has happened? Why is it not possible for you to reach agreement?

[Petrovskiy in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation] First of all I have to say that on this occasion, on this issue, when we agreed we would examine the case of medium-range missiles separately, to tell the truth we also took into consideration the wishes of the European countries. When we proposed a so-called package deal in Reykjavik to the Americans, they asked: What is the good of this packages? It would be better if we resolved the individual problems separately. We agreed to this, so that, in fact...

[Chrudinak, interrupting] Without linkage [oesszekapcsolas], without linkage [preceding word in English]?

[Petrovskiy] Yes, without linkage; we had stopped this linkage [preceding word in English], and now it is they who are starting to link things. They link operational and tactical missiles with the medium-range missiles. But Mikhail Gorbachev told Shultz last time: Alright, we are ready to include these operational and tactical missiles in this agreement. Now the West, if I may so put it, is having an attack of some kind of political spasm; it is in agony about this issue and cannot decide what to do. At the same time, in this situation they are now making attempts to consolidate their positions. But not by means of political agreements; rather by trying to wrest for themselves some kind of military superiority.

[Chrudinak] In Paris and Bonn they are now saying -- and NATO's Commander in Chief Rogers is also of the view -- that they need nuclear deterrence. They say this doctrine has so far proved itself very well, has worked superbly, since it held up the

Soviet Union which, in the field of conventional armaments, in their opinion, is much stronger than they are. What do you reply to this argument of theirs, according to which, if there were no nuclear deterrence, war would break out, because the Soviets are aggressive and so on?

[Petrovskiy] First of all, I can say to you that I am unable to accept their first assertion that the only reason war has not broken out so far is because nuclear deterrence exists and operates. This is just as if, prior to World War II, let us assume, we had said that chemical weapons -- which we can also say is a weapon of mass destruction -- will prevent the outbreak of war.

But chemical weapons still did not prevent the outbreak of the World War. As for the assertions that in the field of conventional armaments the Soviet Union has superiority, I think this is not a very honest approach, since at the official level the fact is pretty well known by NATO's political and military leaders that there is an approximate equality between us. In respect of certain kinds of weapons the Soviet Union has a quantitative superiority; in relation to other armaments, however, the United States and the NATO member states have it. But all in all we can talk about equality, parity. But if it is a question of our talking seriously about this topic, from the viewpoint of the politician, the diplomat, then we must also say that in response to these concerns we made the proposal, in Budapest as a matter of fact...

[Chrudinak, interrupting] At the consultations of the Warsaw Pact?

[Petrovskiy] Yes, the Warsaw Pact proposed that we should begin the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe. And what is more, we proposed a pretty accelerated rate, that by the start of the nineties, already the two military blocs should reduce the numbers of their armed forces by nearly 1 million. Since the Budapest consultation of the Warsaw Pact 1 year has already elapsed, but there is still no response. If the NATO countries are really seriously anxious over conventional armaments then we can justifiably ask why they rejected our proposal for the meeting of Warsaw Pact and NATO military chief commanders. At this meeting it would have been possible to debate all issues of European military policy. It seems to me that the task now is that we should learn to live in peace. We must learn to live without nuclear weapons; we must live without them as mankind has learned, for example, to live without cannibalism, the keeping of slaves and colonization. For these things were also invented by man; he created them. But man is nonetheless capable of living without these things. Well then, why could mankind not live without nuclear weapons? One year has elapsed since we last met. But unfortunately in diplomacy there has been practically no progress whatsoever. I am thinking about the signing of agreements. We hold discussions, but no agreement has come into being in diplomacy. In military policy, on the other hand, in this period the realization of a new military program has been started. A situation is developing which in Russian we call a kind of scissors. The military programs are implemented, but at the diplomatic level no agreements have come into being.

[Chrudinak] In that case, could we see Chancellor Kohl's attitude also as an obstacle on the path leading to the signing of agreement? On 4 June the chancellor will announce his definitive stance. How do you evaluate his attitude?

[Petrovskiy] I am counting on it, that sober thinking will in the end gain ground, after all, also in the highest political circles of the German Federal Republic. I could even say that now there is a historic chance for the FRG to have the opportunity to show whether it really wants a change in the European situation -- the key to which is the reduction of the extent of military confrontation; or is its intention to continue its military effort? This is a historic opportunity. [end recording]

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW TV CITES SHULTZ ON VENICE MEETING, INF

OW031433 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1120 GMT 3 Jun 87

[From "The World Today" program, presented by Igor Fesunenکو]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State Shultz said on Tuesday that any concrete statement on the position of the leaders of the Western world on medium-range missiles should not be expected from the forthcoming regular meeting in Venice of the leaders of seven major capitalist countries of the world that will be held 8-9 June. I do not think, he said, that the group of participants in the summit meeting is suitable for attempting to give a response to proposals on nuclear medium-range missiles. He added that this issue will be discussed in Reykjavik, at the NATO Council session, in which ministers of foreign affairs of all the NATO countries will participate.

Honestly speaking, I do not quite understand this. After all, the heads of state will meet in Venice. Why cannot they, statesmen of such stature and high position -- why is this highest of levels unsuitable, as Shultz said, for solving this question, one of the most important and topical issues of the day?

Well, let us not engage in polemics with the secretary of state but rather take note of the desire of the United States -- which came out in his statements -- to nonetheless keep [sokhranit] part of its nuclear warheads on West German territory and to skillfully remove them from the inventory of those medium-range and operational and tactical missiles subject to reduction. For example, regarding the request to report on the U.S. reaction to the West German desire to keep Pershing 1A missiles on its territory, Shultz responded that the United States supports Bonn's position. As you know, we are talking about 72 missiles of this type with U.S. warheads that are under Washington's control.

From the very beginning in Geneva, Shultz said, we have adhered to a position according to which talks between the United States and the USSR extend exclusively to the systems of only these two countries, while the systems of third countries are not objects of the talks -- neither the British, French, nor Pershing systems.

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: FURTHER CRITICISM OF NATO NUCLEAR GROUP STAVANGER SESSION

'Dedication to Nuclear Weapons'

PM261147 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 May 87 Second Edition p 5

[TASS reports: "Behind a Fence of Reservations. The NATO Military Ministers Are Opposed to the Elimination of Nuclear Armaments in Europe"]

[Text] Oslo, 16 May -- Despite the loud statements about a "desire to contribute to disarmament," the leaders of the North Atlantic bloc's military departments are holding a course toward the buildup of nuclear armaments. [paragraph continues]

This is evidenced by the results of a 2-day session of the NATO nuclear planning group at defense minister level in the Norwegian city of Stavanger. The communique published at the end of the session abounds in statements about NATO's dedication to nuclear weapons. "We will preserve and improve the nuclear forces necessary for the implementation of a flexible response strategy," the document says.

The session devoted considerable attention to the question of medium-range nuclear forces in Europe. Although the communique "welcomes the improvement in the prospects of the conclusion of an agreement between the United States and the USSR" in that sphere, this statement is accompanied by a multitude of reservations and extra conditions. In fact, the final communique does not provide a constructive response to the Soviet proposals on ridding Europe of nuclear weapons.

Addressing journalists in Stavanger, U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger said that NATO must block all Soviet efforts to eliminate all nuclear weapons in Europe. At the same time, he admitted that the defense ministers had not reached agreement on whether the United States should go along with the proposal on eliminating medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. The Pentagon chief demanded that there be an "arms upgrading" in the event of the conclusion of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. I would prefer, he said, to add something to the U.S. nuclear arsenal in Europe. In particular, he mentioned bomber aircraft and artillery.

In an interview for NBC Weinberger stresses that NATO does not intend to abandon its military doctrine envisaging the possibility of a first nuclear strike.

Washington, 16 May -- The defense ministers confirmed at the Norway session their dedication to modernizing nuclear weapons, THE WASHINGTON POST stresses. In private

conversations the ministers backed the development of a new tactical battlefield weapon, a new free-falling aerial bomb, and a new air-launched missile -- weapons which are not affected by the Soviet-U.S. agreement currently under discussion. The ministers, the paper continued, also discussed the question of adding F-111 fighter bombers and cruise missiles to the NATO arsenal.

Paris, 16 May -- LE MONDE notes that the members of the North Atlantic Alliance "are hostile toward the idea of a nuclear-free Europe." In Stavanger, the paper points out, the defense ministers, headed by C. Weinberger, reaffirmed their adherence to the "nuclear deterrence" strategy.

'Paralyzed Will'

PM271357 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 87 First Edition p 3

[Captain First Rank V. Kuzar commentary under the rubric "International Notes: "Old Positions"]

[Text] Decades of membership of the North Atlantic bloc and the constant gambling on "nuclear deterrence" have literally paralyzed the will of the ruling circles of a number of NATO countries. They simply cannot imagine relinquishing the nuclear strategy and building international relations on a nonnuclear basis. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group session held in the Norwegian city of Stavanger was the latest evidence of this.

The defense ministers of the 14 bloc countries, with the exception of France and Iceland, who are not members of the NATO military organization, spent 2 days working out a joint position with regard to the recent Soviet initiatives for the elimination of European nuclear arsenals.

It must be pointed out that the war departments' leaders who came to this session brought by no means identical views on this problems from their governments. It is well known that Norway, Denmark, and Greece unequivocally expressed themselves in favor of nuclear disarmament. Other European NATO countries also approve on the whole the Soviet proposal. On the eve of the session a report came in from London that Britain is ready to agree to the "double zero" option, that is on the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. Now only the FRG has not yet conclusively formulated its position. As for the U.S. representatives, while en route to Stavanger Defense Secretary C. Weinberger called on his colleagues to "block any Soviet attempts to eliminate all nuclear arms in Europe."

And yet, despite the opposition of C. Weinberger and his confederates, it would seem that the situation was favorable for working out a positive approach to the Soviet initiatives. This was facilitated both by the support of the majority of the population of the Western European countries for the idea of ridding the continent of nuclear weapons and by the fact that the Soviet Union's proposals took into account wishes expressed previously in the European capitals. However fear of nuclear disarmament denied the defense ministers the opportunity to rise above old prejudices, and this was shown in the results of the session. The final communique emphasized the bloc's adherence to nuclear weapons. "We will preserve and improve our nuclear forces, which are essential for the realization of a flexible response" -- the document says. These are not merely words. In fact it is a question of NATO carrying out "arms

upgrading" and saturating the continent with new types of weapons. Thus the Atlanticists are planning to deploy B-52 strategic bombers in Britain, increase the numbers of F-111 fighter-bombers present there, and place additional cruise missiles on U.S. submarines, which, according to the Pentagon, are already patrolling regions near Soviet waters.

In direct conjunction with the question of the session's agenda, a discussion developed on other military and political problems. In particular, progress in the fulfillment of NATO programs for the creation of a new generation of conventional arms and chemical weapons was discussed. At the same time Washington's emissaries took measures to suppress criticism of the SDI program and the United States' practical steps to implement it.

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group session showed that the West is not yet ready to give a concerted response to the Soviet peace initiatives. Furthermore, the bloc's military and political leadership continues to stick to its old positions and think in militarist terms. In this connection the decisions taken must be regarded as a continuation of the policy of building up the arms race and expanding military preparations.

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW: NATO HINDERING U.S.-USSR ACCORD ON MISSILES

LD232007 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 23 May 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; Georgiy Zubkov Commentary]

[Text] Hello, comrades. People are talking and writing about this more than about anything else at the moment. This topic is invariably discussed in the course of official visits and during major international meetings. The chance has arisen to sign the first agreement in history on the radical reduction and the virtual elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapon. Everything is ready, it would seem.

What is hindering an agreement with the United States? Let us just ponder this. In the first place, is the reaching of an agreement realistic? Yes, that is quite realistic, replies the Soviet leadership. That is stated yet again in Comrade Gorbachev's answers to the questions of the editors of the L'UNITA newspaper.

Then wherein lies the main obstacle? In the absence of a common stance on the part of the NATO countries with regard to the Soviet proposals on the elimination in Europe of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles.

Non-stop consultations are going on, as are the jaunts from one West European capital to another. Just yesterday the latest Franco-West German meeting ended in Paris. And again there was no agreement. It would seem some West European governments are looking primarily to Bonn. But, as we all know, there is no unity there, even within the government coalition.

But what is preventing Bonn and, together with her, all those other waverers in Western Europe from pronouncing a firm 'Yes' to the Soviet proposals? Fear. But after the elimination of the missiles such an enormous quantity of nuclear weapons will remain in the world that the human race could be destroyed not once, but many times over. On our planet there are already 50,000 nuclear rounds, and on average each one of those is 30 times more powerful than the one dropped on Hiroshima.

Lack of trust. But how to overcome that? Trust does not spring up just like that. What is needed is searches, not expectations. What is needed is decisions.

Dissatisfaction with the Soviet proposals. Yet who but the Soviet Union makes concession after concession, to take into account the concern of Washington and her allies? Medium-range missiles have been taken out of the general disarmament package. The nuclear potentialities of Britain and France have been set to one side, even though they continue to grow and be improved. Interests in operational and tactical missiles, conventional and chemical weapons have been taken account of.

Perhaps what is lacking is political realism. But here everything necessary must be undertaken in order to move forward. The nuclear age is mighty but merciless. The opportunity that has arisen cannot be allowed to go begging. To sign an agreement on Euromissiles is to dismantle the first major obstacle on the path to disarmament and open the way to a non-nuclear 21st century.

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS HITS NATO EUROGROUP 25 MAY COMMUNIQUE ON SOVIET OFFER

'Not Ready to Answer'

LD252254 Moscow TASS in English 2030 GMT 25 May 87

[Text] Brussels May 25 TASS -- The Eurogroup of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation held a session here today at the level of defence ministers.

Twelve Western European partners in the alliance (without France and Iceland) adopted a communique on the session's results.

The communique showed that NATO was not ready to give an answer to the Soviet proposal on the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The defence ministers linked such elimination to cuts in conventional armaments and talks on chemical weapons.

Far from ready to give up nuclear weapons, the ministers declared for the preservation of NATO's strategy of "nuclear deterrence" and the continued presence of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe.

The Eurogroup also favoured a further buildup in conventional armaments.

'Double Standards'

LD261936 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1404 GMT 26 May 87

["NATO's Double Standards -- Comment" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow May 26 (TASS) -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

Judging by the communique issued after the NATO Eurogroup's meeting in Brussels, the defense ministers of 12 European countries in the North Atlantic bloc have not yet reached consensus on Soviet proposals concerning medium- and shorter-range missiles.

While saying they welcomed better prospects for an INF (medium-range missile) agreement, the ministers advanced a number of new conditions that call for revising the already agreed upon positions of the Soviet Union and the United States and can therefore seriously complicate an accord.

In interviews with newsmen in Brussels, NATO ministers voiced "anxiety" that eliminating U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe would allegedly reduce security for the NATO countries and should for this reason be compensated not only with the scrapping of Soviet medium-range missiles but also with "significant cuts" in Soviet conventional arms and armed forces.

European "Atlanticists" also demanded that all medium-range missiles outside Europe be destroyed unconditionally, that is that the understanding reached in Reykjavik for the Soviet Union and the United States to retain 100 nuclear warheads each on medium-range missiles respectively in the Asian part of the USSR and on U.S. territory be dropped.

The present U.S. nuclear potential in the Pacific that is zeroed in on the Soviet Union is mostly concentrated, in the meantime, on delivery systems not to be limited or reduced under the U.S. draft treaty, namely on sea-launched cruise missiles, carried-based planes and F-16 fighter bombers deployed in South Korea, Japan, and on Pacific islands.

In the early nineties more than 140 U.S. ships and submarines will be provided with 2,500 launchers for nuclear-tipped 200-kiloton Tomahawk cruise missiles. Such missiles have already been installed on the battleship New Jersey, the cruiser Long Beach, and 15 Spruance-class destroyers. Two years ago Tomahawks were also adopted by 15 U.S. submarines.

The U.S. Pacific fleet includes six carrier groups with a total of over 675 aircraft. More than 200 of these planes are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Many, including Hornets, A-6's, Intruders, and A-7 Corsairs, have an action radius of 1,000 km and can deliver nuclear blows to target deep inside Soviet territory.

Accepting the proposals by European "Atlanticists" for reviewing the Reykjavik understanding for the Soviet Union and the United States each to keep 100 warheads on medium-range missiles respectively in Asia and on U.S. territory without simultaneously reaching agreement that Washington should eliminate its nuclear systems in the Far East would not just complicate an accord but also but also give unilateral military advantages to the United States.

The Soviet Union, as M.S. Gorbachev recently declared, is prepared to solve the issue of globally destroying the medium-range missiles of both sides. For this, the United States needs to eliminate its nuclear weapons in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines and pull back its air-based forces behind agreed lines.

Displaying a "double standard" in dealing with the problems of disarmament, the NATO strategists are continually demanding that bilateral reductions of one class of weapons or another by the USSR and the United States be accompanied by unilateral reduction in Soviet weapons systems in other areas, justifying this with fantastic figures on "Soviet superiority."

In fact there are areas where the United States has real rather than imaginary military superiority and where balancing the forces is a vital need for stabilizing the military-political situation in the world.

The United States has 20 aircraft-carriers, including 5 nuclear-powered ones, while the Soviet Union has none at all.

The U.S. Navy includes 12 aircraft-capable ships, including helicopter-carriers and multipurpose amphibious vessels, while the Soviet Navy has only 6 aircraft-capable ships.

Characteristically, the United States flatly refuses to conduct talks on the arms and fields of military activities where it has an advantage. These include, for example, U.S. forward-based systems, U.S. military bases surrounding the Soviet Union, and naval forces, including aircraft-carriers.

No serious talks on arms limitation can be conducted on the basis of double standards and different approaches to ensuring the security of the countries involved. It is high time NATO strategy-makers realized that.

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: NATO DEFENSE PLANNING GROUP HOLDS 2-DAY SESSION

'Militarist Spirit'

LD261624 Moscow TASS in English 1532 GMT 26 May 87

[Text] Brussels May 26 TASS -- TASS correspondent Albert Balebanov reports:

A two-day session of the NATO Defense Planning Committee which opened here today behind closed doors, is keynoted for its militarist spirit. This is clear from pronouncements made at a press conference by West German General W. Altenburg, chairman of the NATO Military Committee. He said that the defence ministers participating in the session agreed to raise military expenditures and to boost arms purchases.

The general insistently emphasized that NATO did not intend to give up its "nuclear deterrent" strategy and that nuclear weapons had been and would remain an important supplement to arsenals of conventional weapons. He clearly intimated thereby that the idea of complete liquidation of nuclear weapons is not to the liking of NATO.

INF Stance Critiqued

LD272121 Moscow TASS in English 1614 GMT 27 May 87

[Text] Brussels May 27 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Albert Balebanov:

A session of the NATO Defense Planning Committee at the level of defence ministers (without France and Iceland) ended at the headquarters of the North Atlantic Alliance today.

Like the meeting of NATO's Eurogroup, it failed to provide an answer to concrete Soviet proposals on the elimination of nuclear missiles in Europe. In tribute to the times, the ministers declared in their final communique their readiness to promote progress in East-West relations, especially in arms control area, by attaining security at a lower level of forces. However, nothing was done to back up these words. Moreover, as U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said at a press conference, participants in the session called for more efforts to build up conventional weapons and increase military expenditure.

The Pentagon chief made every effort in Brussels to drag the alliance partners into U.S. plans of increasing the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf.

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET SPOKESMAN HITS NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS BRUSSELS MEETING

LD281255 Moscow TASS in English 1234 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 28 TASS -- "The NATO defence ministers' meeting in Brussels has again shown that NATO members do not intend to abandon the strategy of flexible response and nuclear deterrence", Yuriy Gremetskykh, first deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at a briefing here today.

"The defence ministers," he pointed out, "did not come forward with a positive stand as regards the Soviet proposals on the elimination of medium-and shorter-range missiles in Europe". "One gathers the impression that they were preoccupied with the question of which arms should make up for the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles on the European continent if an appropriate agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States is concluded, rather than with the question of how to reduce nuclear confrontation in Europe as the Soviet proposals envisage."

"In particular," the spokesman said, "the ministers declared for a further increase in military budgets and a build-up in conventional arms". "The tattered body of a Soviet threat", Yuriy Gremetskykh emphasised, "is used every time when an arms build-up is sought. This is how it was this time as well. Particularly zealous in this respect was U.S. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger who perceived aggressiveness even in the current reorganisation process in the Soviet Union."

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET ARMY PAPER CRITICIZES FRG AMBIVALENCE

PM201055 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 87 First Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov article: "NATO's European Spearhead. Notes of a Military Observer"; passages within slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] "We must not allow the policy of mutual understanding and alignment of interests and the active ensurance of peace to become more and more emasculated or, who knows, actually even condemned to oblivion.... The demand for us to make any reasonably conceivable contribution to easing tension and reducing the threat within the framework of East-West relations is meeting with wide approval.... This is precisely because we, the Germans, cannot allow ourselves a new cold war."

These are the words of the distinguished FRG political figure Willy Brandt. Concerned at the new reactionary turn in Bonn's foreign policy, at the beginning of the year he made a statement addressed to the country's public on the FRG Government's policy. Willy Brandt drew his compatriots' attention to the fact that numerous speeches by responsible representatives of the ruling coalition are fostering the impression that one can only talk and talk about "an ever decreasing quantity of arms," while unconcernedly facilitating a further twist in the arms race spiral." [quotation marks as published]

The concern of one of the FRG's senior political figures has a very real foundation. In fact Bonn's abundant assurances of its desire to create a world "with an ever decreasing quantity of arms" too often differs from its real actions. The discrepancy and inconsistency in the West German leadership's positions on questions of disarmament were clearly revealed in the federal chancellor's government statement the other day. In making this statement, H. Kohl simply failed to express Bonn's definitive attitude to the Soviet proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe.

The irritating old claims of a mythical "substantial Soviet military superiority" once again were expressed in the government statement.

The impression is formed that, on the question of the fate of U.S. first-strike nuclear missiles sited on West German territory, the FRG Government is -- figuratively speaking -- trying to be a bigger Catholic than the pope himself: From the camp of the ruling parties on the Rhine, voices in favor of retaining these missiles can be heard today more loudly, possibly, than the analogous arguments put forward by the Potomac backers of the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles.

Let us observe that there are people in the ruling coalition who fully understand the unattractiveness of such a position. According to DER SPIEGEL, Christian Democratic Union Secretary General Geissler, for example, accuses his party comrades of publicly, like "the worst idiots," campaigning against the double zero option instead of advancing positive arguments. However, this in no way means that Geissler is against the missiles. He is only in favor of a "more subtle" approach to this problem. Until now, in Geissler's words, the debate within the Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] "was not developing in the right direction." While criticizing the most unbridled advocates of retaining the nuclear missiles, this figure rejoins: They have not understood that it is actually possible to say "yes, but..."

However, even such a "subtle" approach to the resolution of one of the most important problems of our time does not stand up to criticism. This was convincingly illustrated by the West German newspaper UNSERE ZEIT, which compared Bonn's "buts" with the socialist countries' proposals.

/Bonn's first "but." The Federal Republic favors the zero option for medium-range missiles in Europe, but at the same time there should be negotiations on shorter-range missiles.../

Fact: The USSR is ready for immediate negotiations on reducing operational and tactical nuclear missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 km. During the negotiations, both sides' nuclear potential must be frozen. Irrespective of these negotiations, in the event of a zero option on medium-range missiles, the USSR will withdraw from the GDR and the CSSR, by agreement with these countries' governments, those operational and tactical missiles which were placed there in response to the appearance of the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in West Europe.

/Bonn's second "but." The federal government welcomes the readiness to conduct negotiations on operational and tactical missiles, also. But there still remains the Soviet superiority in tactical nuclear weapons (with a range of up to 500 km./

Fact: Back in 1986, the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact member states offered to start negotiations on a sharp reduction in conventional armaments and in tactical missiles, aircraft, artillery, and other types of tactical nuclear weapons. The GDR and CSSR proposal to create a 150-wide nuclear-free corridor in central Europe should be added to this.

/Bonn's third "but." It would be nice to destroy, all nuclear weapons, but then the USSR, having maintained its conventional armaments superiority, could wage an aggressive war without fear of nuclear retaliation./

Fact: The USSR and the other Warsaw Pact members states advocate a radical reduction in armed forces and conventional arms. Last June in Budapest they proposed as a first step that each side reduce its strength by 100,000-150,000 soldiers in order subsequently to reduce the ground forces and tactical aviation forces of both military-political alliances in Europe by approximately 25 percent. Thus each side's armed forces would be reduced by approximately 500,000 men, including the corresponding armament. In addition, the Warsaw Pact repeatedly has proposed to NATO the conclusion of a nonaggression agreement.

In this way the Soviet peace initiatives, as the West German press established, do not leave arms supporters any room for tactical maneuvering, and in any case they do not

allow them to retain the image of peacemaker. "If the gods wish to punish us, they answer our prayers" -- Oscar Wilde's aphorism best characterizes the situation of those who while expatiating on their desire for disarmament laid down numerous "conditions," which they clearly expected the other side to reject.

It looks as if the FRG's ruling circles are incapable of accepting the thought that that the country will cease to play the role of NATO's European spearhead. It was assigned this role more than 30 years ago, when the FRG, pursuing active remilitarization, became the 15th member of the North Atlantic bloc. During the last 3 decades or so Bonn has developed some hefty militarist muscle. Today West German servicemen form nearly half of NATO's Armed Forces in Europe, while more than 60 percent of NATO's tanks on our continent belong to the Bundeswehr. Almost one-third of the North Atlantic bloc's warplanes are in West Europe and the same quantity of naval forces are West German. The FRG is the only NATO country to dedicate all of its Armed Forces' operational subunits to the execution of NATO-oriented tasks. West German territory houses the launch installations for U.S. first-strike nuclear missiles, and large stocks of U.S. chemical weapons are concentrated here.

The FRG is among the bloc countries with the most militarized state budget. Gigantic sums are spent here on producing the latest types of arms. After the last postwar ban--on the production of heavy weapons--was lifted in 1984, the FRG has increased the scale of its participation in the arms race. The FRG's earlier, officially proclaimed repudiation of weapons of mass destruction is patently not to the liking of the militarists on the Rhine. They are now trying their hardest to break into the new generation of strategic weapons--space weapons. They see the way to this both in participation in the U.S. "Star Wars" program and in the development of the so-called "European Defense Initiative."

The cutting edge of "NATO's European spearhead" is sharpened year by year. Western imperialist circles obviously do not intend this weapon pointed at the socialist countries to remain hidden in its sheath. The press recently announced that hundreds of neutron munitions designed for use in Europe are being manufactured in the United States. The Bundeswehr already has in its armory 72 Pershing-1A missiles which can employ such munitions. In the very near future it is planned to replace these missiles with the more sophisticated Pershing-1B.

Guided by the new political thinking and the sincere desire to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, the USSR and the other states of the socialist community have made substantial moves toward the West and rightly expect a constructive response, from the FRG included. Thanks to the proposals on reducing medium-range missiles -- the West German DEUTSCHE VOLKSZEITUNG-TAT wrote the other day -- a new opportunity to reverse the arms race spiral has arisen. However, this goes exactly against the true wishes of the NATO "hawks." This is precisely why they are opposing so furiously the socialist states' constructive initiatives designed to consolidate peace and the peoples' security.

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: FRG ASSERTIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS 'GROUNDLESS'

LD012214 Moscow TASS in English 2010 GMT 1 Jun 87

[Text] Bonn June 1 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vladimir Serov reports: A meeting of leaders of the parties of the CDU/CSU and the Free Democratic Party ruling coalition was held here today with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the chair. The meeting was devoted to working out the common stand on problems of disarmament.

A report circulated here says that the participants in the conference declared in favour of the elimination of all medium-range missiles of the USSR and the USA, "best of all on a global scale," and also for the conclusion of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on the elimination of shorter-range missiles with a range of from 500 to 1,000 km, also on a global scale.

The leaders of the parties of the ruling coalition insist, however, that the 72 Pershing-1 missiles that were adopted for service by the Bundeswehr and that can be fitted out with nuclear warheads any time should not be taken into consideration.

Though it is said in the report on the results of the meeting that the highest aim of the FRG policy is to ensure peace and to prevent both conventional and nuclear war, the report shows that the Bonn Cabinet continues adhering to the strategy of "nuclear deterrence."

West German leaders repeat groundless assertions about the preponderance of the Warsaw Treaty countries in conventional armaments but do not answer concrete proposals of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states for the reduction of these armaments and on some other aspects of disarmament.

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS REPORTS ON SOVIET MEETINGS WITH FRG FIGURES

Gromyko Receives Former President

PM041239 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jun 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Expanding Mutually Beneficial Cooperation"]

[Text] Andrey Gromyko, a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, received on 2 June in the Kremlin prominent West German public figure Walter Scheel, honorary chairman of the Free Democratic Party and former federal president of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The guest is in Moscow in connection with guest performances by Deutsche Oper am Rhein, which is popular in his country.

The meeting, which passed in an atmosphere of good will and frankness [otkrovennyy], issues of bilateral relations between the USSR and the FRG as well as today's international situation.

Gromyko said there was no task more important today than ensuring a lasting peace and attaining practical results in the field of disarmament.

In this context, exceptional significance was noted during the meeting of Soviet proposals for eliminating medium-range missiles. Ending nuclear confrontation in the continent directly meets the security interests of all European countries, including the FRG. Their high economic potential and extensive historical and political experience make it possible to take practical action to enhance European security.

Scheel spoke of the great significance of Soviet initiatives for solving the problem of reducing nuclear arms in Europe. He also called for broader, mutually advantageous cooperation between the USSR and the FRG, saying that there was every objective prerequisite for it and that the FRG Government was fully aware of that.

Both sides pointed to the key significance of the Moscow Treaty of August 12, 1970, which has started the process of normalizing relations between the USSR and the FRG and made a big contribution to strengthening security in Europe in general. It is important, relying on the accumulated positive experience, to continue working for the broadening of relations between the USSR and the FRG. The interlocutors pointed out

The fact that the Moscow Treaty these days is proving its vitality and necessity with ever greater vigor.

Gromyko stressed the significance of the decisions of a recent Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member countries.

During the meeting, he explained to Scheel the restructuring principles of Soviet domestic policy, the perestroyka drive and the prospects being opened by this deep-going political, social and economic process. Stress was placed on the organic connection between the constructive goals of the domestic policy of the USSR and the perestroyka effort, on the one hand, and the objectives of the Soviet Union's foreign policy of peace, on the other.

Andreas Meyer-Landrut, ambassador of the FRG to the USSR, sat in on the conversation.

Scheel left for home on the same day.

Deputy Premier in Bonn, Munich

LD082234 Moscow TASS in English 2104 GMT 8 May 87

[Text] Bonn May 8 TASS -- The Soviet delegation led by Vsevolod Murakhovskiy, first vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, chairman of the USSR State Agri-Industrial Committee, was on a visit in the FRG on May 3-8.

In Bonn the Soviet delegation met with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl and FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, in Munich -- with CSU Chairman, Bavaria's Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss.

In discussing topical international issues, the delegation drew attention to the USSR's proposals aimed at a radical reduction of nuclear weapons. The West German side was briefed on the reorganisation currently under way in the Soviet Union and in the political, economic and social fields.

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: RESPONSE TO KOHL 4 JUNE STATEMENT ON ZERO OPTION

'Implementation Conditional'

LD041729 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1205 GMT 4 Jun 87

[Report by correspondents Vladimir Serov and Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Bonn, 4 Jun (TASS) -- FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the Bundestag today delivered a government statement concerning disarmament. His speech confirmed that official Bonn is declaring in words only a readiness to assist progress in the sphere of disarmament while continuing by its deeds to impede this process.

Having stated that "Bonn and NATO's highest political aim is the prevention of any kind of war, either conventional or nuclear, in Europe," the chancellor at the same time completely rejected the idea of creating a nuclear-free Europe. He said: We do not share aspirations aimed at the full elimination of nuclear weapons on the continent.

Concerning the FRG Government's readiness to act in a spirit of "new thinking" and welcoming in words the call of Warsaw Pact states for the creation of an all-embracing system of international security, H. Kohl nonetheless defended the obsolete strategy, which goes against the demands of the modern epoch, of "nuclear deterrence". In his view "there is no alternative in the foreseeable future" to the NATO concept of a so-called "flexible response" which envisages the use of both nuclear and conventional weapons.

Having supported in general the proposals on eliminating medium-range missiles as well as operational and tactical missiles in Europe, the chancellor, also made their implementation conditional. He pointed out: "For the FRG Government there can be no question of an unconditional acceptance of the Soviet 'zero option' proposal for missiles with a range from 500 to 1000 km." Bonn's main preliminary condition is not to include in the "double zero option" on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles either "Pershing 1A" missiles, with which the Bundeswehr is equipped, or U.S. nuclear warheads which go with them.

The chancellor termed "a step in the right direction" the readiness expressed in the documents of the Berlin conference of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact states to remove the imbalances and asymmetry which have arisen in certain elements of conventional weapons. Nonetheless he continued to talk about a "threat" supposedly being created to the FRG by the imaginary "superiority" of socialist countries in conventional weapons.

Pershing-1A Question

LD042311 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 4 Jun 87

[Telephone conversation between Moscow radio presenter Vitaliy Sobolev and Moscow radio correspondent in Bonn, Vladimir Petrovich Kondratyev, on the subject of FRG Chancellor Kohl's government statement before the Bundestag 4 June -- recorded]

[Excerpts] Among today's reports, a telegram from the FRG on the speech of Chancellor Kohl attracts attention. He presented the position of his country in relation to the Soviet proposal on scrapping medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe.

The fact of Kohl making a speech had been known beforehand and it had been expected since, apart from the FRG, other NATO countries spoke out, although with reservations, for a treaty on scrapping these missiles. We have gotten in touch with our correspondent in Bonn, Vladimir Kondratyev. Please listen to the recording of our conversation:

[Sobolev] Vladimir Petrovich, could you describe the essence of Kohl's speech?

[Kondratyev] His government statement and the following debates, so to say, were supposed to be a concluding chord in that long and tiring discussion in the FRG on missiles. They were supposed to be and they were not. Some questions have remained unclarified and, as before, one can interpret the government position in various ways. [passage omitted]

[Kondratyev] Bonn insists that 72 Pershing-1A missiles should be excluded from the Soviet-U.S. talks on medium- and short-range missiles. These missiles are at the command of the Bundeswehr, that is, they are being serviced by West German military staff.

[Sobolev] However, their warheads are American, are they not?

[Kondratyev] However, the warheads are located on a U.S. base in the FRG under the control of the Americans.

[Sobolev] So, since these are U.S. weapons, surely they should be included in the circle of questions that are under discussion at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on the elimination of such missiles?

[Kondratyev] Of course! Yet Bonn insists that these weapons should be excluded from the talks under the pretext that they belong to a third side. What the U.S. nuclear missiles have to do with the FRG is not clear at all. [passage omitted]

Of course, what has been said today in the Bundestag certainly is a step forward compared to statements in the past, but this step is not firm and lacks confidence.

'Merely Paying Lipservice'

PM051329 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jun 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Statement by the FRG Chancellor"]

[Text] Bonn, 4 Jun -- FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl delivered a government statement on disarmament questions in the Bundestag today. His speech confirmed that Bonn officialdom is merely paying lipservice to disarmament when it speaks of its readiness to promote progress in this sphere, while in practice it continues to hamper this process.

Declaring that "the highest political aim of Bonn and NATO is forestalling both conventional and nuclear war in Europe," the chancellor at the same time categorically rejected the idea of the creation of a nuclear-free Europe. We do not share the desire to totally eliminate all nuclear weapons from the continent, he said.

While speaking of the FRG Government's readiness to act in the spirit of the "new thinking" and welcoming the appeal of the Warsaw Pact states for the creation of a comprehensive system of international security in principle, H. Kohl nonetheless defended the obsolete strategy of "nuclear deterrence" which runs counter to the demands of the present age. According to his view, "there will be no alternative in the foreseeable future" to NATO's concept of so-called "flexible response" which envisages the use of both nuclear and conventional weapons.

While expressing support in general terms for the proposals to eliminate medium-range and also operational and tactical missiles in Europe, the chancellor at the same time made their implementation dependent on a number of conditions. "As for the FRG Government, there can be no question of unconditional acceptance of the Soviet 'zero option' proposal for missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 kilometers," he pointed out. Bonn's main precondition is to exclude from the "double zero option" on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles not just the Pershing-1A missiles which the Bundeswehr has in its arsenal, but also the U.S. nuclear warheads to these missiles.

The chancellor described as a "step in the right direction" the readiness of the Warsaw Pact member states expressed in the documents of the Berlin Political Consultative Committee conference to eliminate the imbalances and asymmetry which have developed in some components of conventional arms, yet he proceeded nonetheless to talk about the "threat" allegedly posed to the FRG by the socialist countries' mythical "superiority" in conventional arms.

Willy Brandt, chairman of the SPD [Social Democratic Party] who opened the parliamentary debate on the FRG chancellor's government statement, pointed out that the statement failed to undo the damage inflicted on the cause of disarmament by Bonn's inconsistent stance on this problem. he called on the ruling coalition unconditionally to accept the "double zero option" for medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. It is necessary, the speaker emphasized, for the government to put forward its own disarmament proposals instead of passively waiting for Soviet peace initiatives.

By putting forward ever new preconditions and reservations, Karsten Voight, the SPD parliamentary party expert on foreign policy questions, said, Bonn is trying "to keep a loophole" for a new "arms upgrading" of the Bundeswehr with improved nuclear-capable operational-tactical missiles. [paragraph continues]

According to Angelika Beer, parliamentary deputy representing the Green Party, G. Kohl's statement reaffirmed that the FRG Government seeks "to thwart all effective disarmament." "Ninety percent of our country's citizens favor the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles," Katrin Fuchs, Bundestag deputy for the SPD, said. "I cannot recall any time in the past when the will of the overwhelming majority of our people for disarmament was expressed so clearly and unequivocally."

FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, (FDP) [Free Democratic Party] warned against linkage between various aspects of disarmament. It is necessary, he noted, to intensify our efforts to achieve realistically feasible accords. A speedy conclusion of a Soviet-American agreement on medium-range missiles would have a beneficial effect on talks concerning other disarmament problems and would give a positive boost to East-West relations in general.

Making use of their majority, the deputies of the parties of the ruling Bonn coalition -- the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] and FDP -- rejected the draft resolutions submitted by the SPD and the Green Party which demand that the West German Pershing-1A operational and tactical missiles be included in a possible agreement on the elimination of medium-range and operational tactical missiles in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW: FRG PERSHING-1A'S 'BEYOND FRAMEWORK' OF ARMS TALKS

LD052136 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 5 Jun 87

[From the "News Today" program, hosted by Aleksey Strogonov, Borin commentary]

[Excerpts] An official of the Soviet Communist Party Nikolay Portugalov said today he hoped NATO would back Bonn's demand to keep 72 Pershing-1A missiles deployed in Federal Germany when an arms reduction accord is signed. [passage omitted] The Soviet negotiators in Geneva have said the Pershing-1A missiles should be covered by any accord to eliminate shorter-range missiles from Europe, that is missiles with a reach of from 300 to 600 miles. Well, Nikolay Borin, would you like to comment?

[Borin] I think the issue of the Pershing-1A missiles goes beyond the framework of the arms control negotiations. It has crucial political implications for the future of Europe, and not only of Europe. You know that Federal Germany is forbidden to have nuclear weapons. [passage omitted] I think that any attempts to upset this and to give Bonn any hopes of possessing its own nuclear potential is fraught with grave consequences. But Pershings are American-made missiles, and their warheads are under American control. But nonetheless I see in Bonn's position not a lack of logic but the deepseated ambition to join the nuclear club.

[Strogonov] What arguments can you produce to back up your point?

[Borin] The staunchest supporter of the idea of a European nuclear fighting force is the Federal Germany right wing leader Franz Josef Strauss, well known for his nonacceptance of the postwar realities in Europe. And he has received backing from Chancellor Helmut Kohl. It is clear that through a European nuclear fighting force, Bonn is seeking to gain access to nuclear decisions and nuclear arms. True, the NATO secretary general Lord Carrington today ruled out any idea of such a force. But it is not the first time this idea has arisen. It keeps cropping up again and again.

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

IZVESTIYA SEES PARIS, BONN 'UNABLE TO AGREE' ON EUROMISSILES

PM271028 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 May 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko report: "Still Not Clear"]

[Text] Paris -- The 49th Franco-West German summit meeting held here was to be an important step on the path toward the development of a united position for the NATO countries on the question of eliminating medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe.

To this end, Paris and Bonn wanted to reach agreement between themselves on a common approach to the Soviet proposals that could form a basis for all the NATO countries.

A difficult task faced the participants in the meeting -- President F. Mitterand and Prime Minister J. Chirac on the one hand, and FRG Chancellor H. Kohl, accompanied by eight ministers, on the other. The point is that within the ruling circles of France and the FRG there are serious differences in the approach to Euromissiles. As far as Paris is concerned, these emerged once again in recent interviews given by the president and the premier. Whereas F. Mitterrand, on FRG television, approved the "zero option," J. Chirac told the Japanese news agency JIJI that he considers it necessary to preserve the U.S. medium-range nuclear forces in Europe.

Roughly the same picture can be seen on the banks of the Rhine, where the defense minister and the foreign minister have different views on the prospect of eliminating Euromissiles. H. Kohl's own position in the opinion of French observers, is contradictory. It seems that the chancellor and his foreign minister agree to the "zero option" for medium-range and operational and tactical missiles, but set patently unacceptable conditions (one of which, L'HUMANITE notes, is the preservation of the Pershing-1A's with nuclear warheads, which are based on FRG territory).

As the results of the meeting show, despite all their efforts, Paris and Bonn were unable to agree on a united position on Euromissiles. H. Kohl said that he will officially announce the FRG's position in the Bundestag on 4 June. We do not intend to delay or block the Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks, H. Kohl stated at a news conference at the end of the meeting, noting the special position of the FRG, on whose territory, he said, the biggest quantity of weapons in the world is concentrated. He said that his government advocates the elimination of medium-range missiles. The FRG chancellor did not express his view on the question of operational and tactical missiles (from 500 to 1,000 km) noting, however, that an agreement on removing them is fraught with dangerous consequences. As for missiles with a range of up to 500 km, here, he said, a significant imbalance exists between East and West, which is complicated by the inequality in the sphere of chemical and conventional armed forces.

For his part, F. Mitterrand recalled at the news conference that he approved the first "zero option" (that is, the elimination of medium-range missiles -- Yu.K.) and supports the second (the removal of operational and tactical missiles), but expressed regret that the first step along the path of disarmament had not been the 50-percent reduction of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces.

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS REPORTS CHIRAC STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

LD081535 Moscow TASS in English 1414 GMT 8 May 87

[Text] Paris May 8 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Yuriy Lopatin:

French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac has again advocated the maintenance of the so-called "nuclear deterrence" in Europe. "Albeit it would be desirable that all the weapons should disappear, it is necessary to take into account human madness. Only nuclear deterrence leads to sanity," he claimed, speaking in Nantes (Loire Atlantique Department). The prime minister voiced hope that the West European nations would be able to reach a common stand on the Soviet Union's disarmament proposals.

"We must be open to all that is happening in the East, but be firm and vigilant as regards everything which concerns European security," he said. In upholding its stand, Europe, as he put it, should speak a "single voice". Touching upon the balance of forces in Europe, Chirac called for caution as regards everything that could upset the present "fragile balance".

The prime minister again claimed that, unlike other Western nations, there is a "consensus" in France on defence policy issues. Consensus is known to mean full accord. Meanwhile, public opinion polls regularly show that, as an overwhelming majority of Frenchmen (80-85 per cent) believe, now that intensive talks are under way between the USSR and the USA on disarmament issues, France should make her positive contribution to the resolution of that problem, and if an agreement is reached, not to build up her own nuclear force.

The course taken by the right-wing government for weapons race, including nuclear and chemical weapons, is resolutely rejected by the French Communist Party, whose representatives voted in the National Assembly against the country's military programme for the next five years. As the democratic press notes, the point at issue under these conditions is not a "consensus" but only a collusion between right-wing and ultra-rightist parties with the socialists, not more than that.

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

IZVESTIYA ATTACKS FRENCH MINISTER'S STANCE ON ARMS CURBS

PM091559 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jun 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko dispatch: "France: Minister Gambles on the Bomb"]

[Text] Paris -- "Disarmament Threatens Europe," "Soviet Threat on Our Doorstep" -- with these words the front-page banner headlines in FRANCE-SOIR conveyed the essence of an interview which French Defense Minister Andre Giraud granted to that newspaper.

From the pages of the gutter-press FRANCE-SOIR the minister decided to fire another salvo at the disarmament process and the Soviet peace initiatives and once again intimidate his compatriots with the "red danger." And this at a time when people in neighboring capitals -- in London and Bonn above all -- are tending to support the Soviet proposals for the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe and when official Paris too, to judge from recent statements by President F. Mitterrand, appears not to be averse to saying "yes."

"The threat is on our doorstep and could increase if we start disarming anyhow." A. Giraud began the interview with these words. He claimed that all Soviet nuclear warheads without exception could rain down on West Europe.

Both the outline of the reasoning and the arguments of all opponents of disarmament are roughly the same: The Warsaw Pact countries, they say, possess "colossal superiority" in conventional types of armed forces and arms. At the same time, the socialist countries' recent proposals contained in the Warsaw Pact states; military doctrine and concerning, in particular, the reduction of conventional types of armed forces are totally ignored [sentence as published]

If you recall previous statements by the military department chief, it will become clear: In recent months he has headed a "crusade" against the Soviet peace initiatives and disarmament talks.

At a session of the French Council of Ministers at the beginning of March this year he called our proposals for the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe a "bluff." On 8 April, when submitting to the National Assembly a military program of unprecedented scope, he maintained that the Warsaw Pact countries have a 2-, 3-, 7-, and even 10-fold advantage in various kinds of arms. As for nuclear weapons, they remain for him "the only effective means" of preventing war in Europe. LE FIGARO cited his words that France must not fall into the "trap" of talks.

During the recent Paris Franco-West German top-level meeting F. Mitterrand declared that he supports the Soviet proposals for the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles and that France speaks "with one voice" on questions of disarmament (let us recall that it is precisely the president who has the decisive say on supreme political and military questions). What then, do the "voices" of A. Giraud and like-minded people mean?

"Of course," French Premier Jacques Chirac said during his visit to Moscow, "France is in favor of reducing nuclear arms and establishing a balance at the lowest level compatible with general security. Proceeding from this, it welcomed the accord between the USSR and the United States based on the principle of the almost complete elimination of their medium-range nuclear forces.

However, the defense minister takes a stand which goes against that statement.

So what then is France's approach to the problem of eliminating Euromissiles?

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CSO: 5200/1516

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS ON U.S. QUEST FOR 'NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY' IN FAR EAST

LD032043 Moscow TASS in English 2015 GMT 3 Jun 87

[Text] Tokyo June 3 TASS -- Five F-16 nuclear-capable fighter-bombers arrived at the U.S. Air Base Misawa in the north of the Japanese island Honshu. These fighter-planes are included in the second squadron consisting of 25 aircraft which will be deployed at Misawa by the end of July.

27 F-16 aircraft capable of operating against the USSR, DPRK and PRC have already been deployed at the base. Their deployment on Japanese territory was started in 1980 in accordance with the Pentagon's plans to achieve nuclear superiority in the western part of the Pacific. Under these plans, there must be ten "trident" atomic submarines in the Pacific by the year 2000. Ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet are fitted out with "Tomahawk" sea-based missiles. These nuclear weapon systems are supplemented with B-52 strategic bombers stationed on Guam and with F-16 fighter-bombers deployed in the south of the Korean peninsula and in Japan.

Command centres from which the U.S. Command intends to "supervise" nuclear conflict are situated in Japan in addition to nuclear delivery vehicles.

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CSO: 5200/1516

CANADA: GORBACHEV MESSAGE, CLARK ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES

Soviet Visitor, Gorbachev Message

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 4 May 87 p A3

[Text]

TORONTO (CP) — An appeal from Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev for Canada "to help guide the West" in reaching a deal to eliminate nuclear missiles in Europe was carried directly to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, the *Toronto Star* says.

In a week-end report, the newspaper quoted special envoy Alexander Bessmertnykh, who visited Ottawa Friday, saying Canadian officials showed "great interest" in Gorbachev's message to Mulroney.

After what was a rare visit in Canadian-Soviet relations, Bessmertnykh said in an interview there is a danger Moscow's proposals will constantly be dismissed instead of being used as the basis for an accord.

"The next few weeks are going to be tremendously important" in attempts to reach a pact to cut

Europe's medium-range missiles, said Bessmertnykh, who met with Mulroney, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and senior officials from Clark's department.

"Our earnest hope is that Canada will play a role in helping to guide the West to a basically sound response to our arms-control proposals."

He dismissed a suggestion that Gorbachev's bid to enlist the federal government's support was an effort to further divide the western alliance, which is split over proposals to curb European missiles.

"We have no desire, no intention of trying to spoil (Canada's) good relations with its neighbors," said Bessmertnykh, who pledged more consultations in what he said would become a "growing practice of exchanges" between Canadian and Soviet leaders.

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 5 May 87 p A8

[Text]

The nuclear arms reduction race reached Ottawa Friday, when special Soviet envoy Alexander Bessmertnykh delivered a special message to Prime Minister Mulroney from General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

One report stated that Gorbachev urged Mulroney to play a broker role in getting the West to accept the Soviet deal to eliminate all nuclear missiles from Europe. This was later denied by the Soviet Embassy, which claimed the visit was but one part of a broader effort throughout the Western alliance to conclude such an accord.

In any event, it's doubtful that either Mulroney or Gorbachev would resort to such mediation at this critical stage in the negotiations. Gorbachev, with the U.S. already on-side, doesn't need a Trudeau-type effort.

And Mulroney would be much less likely than his Liberal predecessor to want to break ranks with his NATO colleagues at this sensitive time — NATO is currently debating the pros and cons of cutting or eliminating short- and shorter-range Euromissiles.

The issues remaining to be resolved both inside the Western alliance and at the U.S.-Soviet negotiating table in Geneva concern verification details, the precise timetable for both sides' withdrawal within the agreed five-year time-frame, and the location of the 100 missiles to remain in Soviet Asia and the U.S. respectively.

Above all, NATO members are still considering the question of shorter-range missiles. What should the Western position be on them? Britain and France appear to be coming around to accepting a zero solution for these, as well as for the longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF). So does Bonn, where the debate has been fast and furious. The other NATO allies are more or less on board already.

Popular opinion in the West is undoubtedly playing an important role. The attraction of eliminating both longer-range and shorter-range missiles cannot be denied. Although those responsible for NATO security would prefer to have some nuclear weapons remain in Europe as a counter to the superior Soviet conventional forces there, Western political leaders must respond to public opinion whenever possible.

In fact, NATO's nuclear option would remain intact because of nuclear weapons remaining in the area on ships, aircraft and submarines manned by American, British and French crews.

The Soviet draft treaty given to Mulroney may need considerable refinement to make it acceptable to all the Western allies. But — based as it is on Western initiatives ignored by Moscow for several years and now suddenly adopted as Russia's own — it should ultimately be merged into an historic agreement acceptable to both East and West.

Clark on INF Proposals

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 11 May 87 p A6

[Text]

BADEN-BADEN, West Germany (CP) — Canada supports the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said Sunday.

Clark acknowledged at a news conference wrapping up his eight-day visit to West Germany and three Soviet bloc countries that the recent barrage of Soviet arms proposals has left the NATO alliance struggling to come up with a common position.

He said Canada doesn't want to do anything to disrupt NATO unity and wants any deal linked to reductions in conventional forces.

But he made it clear the federal government endorses proposals for the elimination of medium-range missiles, the so-called zero-zero option.

"Canada's position on those negotiations is that our preference would be for a zero-zero option," he said.

The zero-zero option covers nu-

clear missiles in Europe that have a range of about 1,000 to 5,000 kilometres.

Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have proposed draft treaties they say call for the elimination of the medium-range missiles in Europe. Negotiators for the two countries are trying to reach agreement on the issue at talks in Geneva.

Clark did not address the more controversial Soviet offer to also eliminate shorter-range nuclear missiles — the so-called double-zero option — which has at least temporarily split NATO.

The United States has greeted this Soviet offer more warmly than some western European countries.

Britain, France and West Germany are leery about the offer and any further cuts in the western nuclear arsenal in light of what some western countries says is Soviet superiority in conventional forces in Europe.

/13104

CSO: 5220/48

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

SOVIET DELEGATION IN NORWAY--Oslo, 16 May--The group of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies headed by Ya. Ya. Vagris, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, has met with Norwegian Prime Minister G. Harlem Brundtland and Foreign Minister T. Stoltenberg. An exchange of opinions took place on topical international problems, including questions of disarmament and European security. The Soviet parliamentarians acquainted with the Norwegian statesmen with the Soviet Union's initiatives directed at liberating Europe from medium-range nuclear missiles and operational and tactical missiles. The Norwegian leaders noted the importance and usefulness of the conversations held with a view to further expanding contacts between our two neighboring countries. During their stay in Oslo, the representatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet visited the city hall and the university of the Norwegian capital and met with the aktiv of Soviet institutions in Norway. A news conference took place at the USSR Embassy in Norway at which the Soviet guests talked about the restructuring being carried out in the USSR and directions in the activity of the CPSU and the Soviets to expand democracy and answered numerous questions from journalists. [TASS report: "Parliamentarians' Meetings"] [Text] [Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 May 87 Morning Edition p 4 PM] /12858

DOBRYNIN, SENATOR GORE MEET--On 28 May Anatoliy Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received U.S. Senator Albert Gore at his request. As is known, the senator recently announced his candidacy for U.S. President. There was a frank discussion [Otkrovenno Obsuzhdalis] of the present unsatisfactory state of Soviet-American relations and of finding ways for setting them right. An agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe would be a major step in this direction and the American senator's attention was drawn to this. Albert Gore agreed that vigorous efforts and a new mentality on both sides have never been more urgent than now to achieve progress in reducing nuclear armaments. He expressed the view that these issues, just as questions of improving Soviet-American relations in general, will be prominent in the election campaign in the United States. Albert Gore showed lively interest in the USSR's restructuring process and these developments were explained to him. The conversation passed in a constructive spirit of goodwill. [TASS report: "In a Constructive Spirit"] [Text] [Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 May 87 Second Edition p 4 PM] /12858

JAPAN: SOVIET PROPOSAL ON INF REMOVAL SAID 'IRRELEVANT'--Tokyo, 20 May (KYODO)
--A proposal by Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev to remove its intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), from Asia along with the United States is an "irrelevant" one, a senior Foreign Ministry official said Wednesday. "It is irrelevant for Gorbachev to relate the 100 warheads in its Asian region with nuclear arms in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines," the official said on condition of anonymity. The official also said the Gorbachev proposal presupposes the existence of nuclear arms in Japan which the country cannot endorse. A provisional agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union includes the total removal of INF in Europe leaving 100 INF warheads in the Soviet Asian area and the U.S. mainland. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 1212 GMT 20 May 87 OW] /9738

CSO: 5260/099

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

TASS: NATO, WARSAW PACT MEETINGS IN VIENNA

25 May Session

LD251705 Moscow TASS in English 1617 GMT 25 May 87

[Text] Vienna, 25 May (TASS)--A scheduled meeting within the framework of the consultations between representatives of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries has been held here today. They continued discussing questions in connection with the preparation of a mandate for the future talks on a cut in the forces and conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Pact Document Discussed 1 June

LD011315 Moscow TASS in English 1234 GMT 1 Jun 87

[Text] Vienna June 1 TASS -- A regular meeting took place here today within the framework of consultations between representatives of the Warsaw-Treaty and NATO countries on issues connected with the elaboration of a mandate for future talks on a reduction in the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Representatives of socialist countries centered the discussion on the results of the Berlin session of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Treaty member states and their importance for a transition to real cutbacks in the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe in conjunction with tactical nuclear weapons.

The elements of a mandate for future talks on this issue were again set out in the light of the results of the PCC session.

Special attention was drawn to the PCC-adopted document on the defensive nature of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member states and to the proposal to hold a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Such a meeting would take a decision on the beginning of large-scale talks with a view to radically reducing the armed forces, conventional arms, and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe with a corresponding cut in military spending.

It was emphasized that socialist countries awaited an adequate reply from NATO countries to the package of constructive proposals aimed at lowering the level of military confrontation on the continent.

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CSO: 5200/1516

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

MOSCOW: EARLY JUNE REPORTS ON VIENNA CSCE SESSION

Tatarnikov Addresses Plenary Meeting

LD011206 Moscow TASS in English 1145 GMT 1 Jun 87

[Text] Vienna June 1 TASS -- At the regular plenary session of the Vienna meeting of the participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Major-General V.M. Tatarnikov, a member of the Soviet delegation, has assessed progress in the talks on the military aspects of security.

He drew the attention of the participants to the fact that the key direction -- military aspects of security and disarmament in Europe -- are deliberately kept in silence as a result of intentional procrastinations by some NATO countries. The discussion of this theme falls behind the debate on economic and humanitarian issues.

NATO countries are clearly backtracking from their previous positions announced by their foreign ministers at the opening of the Vienna meeting. They expressed, among others, readiness to make concrete proposals on the issues of security and disarmament back in December 1986 and discuss them within the agreed-upon time-frame, but they have failed to do this as yet and are essentially blocking the talks.

The Soviet representative noted that at their recent conference in Brussels the NATO countries came out for increasing the NATO military potential and developing new weapons systems on the basis of modern technology with a view to acquiring military superiority over the Warsaw Treaty, which is in conflict with the objectives of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

He showed on [as received] concrete examples that socialist and several neutral states created the necessary conditions for preparing balanced final document of the Vienna meeting. Tatarnikov emphasized that immediate work could begin, specifically, on issues pertaining to general military and political provisions of European security, regional aspects of disarmament, assessments of the outcome of the work of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, and also on prospects for keeping that conference going on the basis of augmenting anew its mandate.

Accords on these issues would allow the implementation of new effective measures for bolstering stability in Europe. The key impediment on the road to this is lack of political will in the United States and NATO countries, Tatarnikov stated.

NATO 'Avoids' Military Aspects

LD030944 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0830 GMT 3 Jun 87

[Text] A regular session of representatives of states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has taken place in the Austrian capital. Our correspondent Viktor Mikheyev reports from Vienna:

[Mikheyev] The NATO countries at the Vienna meeting have displayed a marked departure from the initial positions voiced at the first plenary session by their foreign ministers. In the past, they expressed readiness to bring in specific proposals concerning security and disarmament issues. The NATO countries have still not done that. They avoid touching on the military aspects of security and disarmament in Europe.

At the conference in Brussels, which has just been held, the NATO countries favored an increase in their military potential and development of new weapon systems on the basis of up-to-date technologies with the aim of achieving military superiority over the Warsaw Pact countries.

In the light of such a position, it is natural that the NATO countries find it difficult to discuss, for instance, the plan to reduce armaments and build trust in Central Europe which was put forward by the Polish People's Republic, as well as other proposals by the socialist countries on reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe.

The socialist countries at the Vienna meeting speak in favor of immediately starting work on general military and political aspects of European security, and in particular, on developing a new additional mandate for the Stockholm conference. The socialist countries have reiterated their proposal: to dissolve simultaneously the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact and to create a universal system of international security.

Kashlev Chides West

LD051331 Moscow TASS in English 1315 GMT 5 Jun 87

[Text] Vienna June 5 TASS -- Speaking at a full-scale session of the Vienna followup meeting today, the leader of the Soviet delegation urged the Western participants to intensify work and stop footdragging in order to hammer out possible accords.

Yuriy Kashlev also called attention once again to the documents adopted by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty members at its meeting in Berlin, which express resolve to make every effort to assist a successful conclusion of the Vienna forum with the adoption of substantive and balanced decisions facilitating real progress towards disarmament and stronger trust among the countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The socialist countries at the Vienna meeting have tabled more than ten proposals on security matters, whose realization would make it possible to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe and reduce the risk of outbreak of an armed conflict.

The NATO countries have been demonstrating their unpreparedness for serious talks on this issue of vital importance to European nations. The NATO members have not made a single proposal on the military aspects of European security to this day.

At informal consultations in Vienna between representatives of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO on cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals efforts to work out the mandate of the future talks have likewise been artificially slowed down.

Things have been moving slowly also in the other groups of the Vienna meeting, which are concerned with the issues of economic, commercial, scientific and technological cooperation and humanitarian matters.

The leader of the Soviet delegation said NATO representatives have even been rejecting editing work on proposals they themselves have submitted.

The Soviet delegation today held a news conference. It was stressed that the obstructionist line of some Western countries is aimed at stalling the all-European forum. Sidestepping the more important problems of security, disarmament and cooperation, the United States and some of its allies have been out to lead the meeting away from the urgent problems worrying Europe today.

All this, it was pointed out at the news conference, is a cause of concern and raises doubts about the sincerity of statements by Western representatives about their commitment to European cooperation.

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CSO: 5200/1516

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

EUROPEAN SECURITY SESSION--Brussels, 29 May (TASS)--A two-day session of the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation opened in the Belgian capital. The session's agenda includes the question on prospects for preserving and strengthening security in Europe in the light of the latest Soviet proposals on nuclear disarmament. Session participants who include prominent politicians and public figures as well as scientists from the Soviet Union, Finland, Greece, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, the FRG and other countries, will discuss opportunities which opened in the recent past for establishing in various European regions zones, free from nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as for cutting conventional weapons. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1201 GMT 29 May 87 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1516

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR'S PETROSYANTS COMMENTS ON TEST BAN TALKS WITH U.S.

Moscow Radio Interview

LD242313 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 24 May 87

[Text] The attention of the world information media is being attracted these days by the Soviet-U.S. talks on halting and banning nuclear weapons tests. They are being held in Geneva. This is what Comrade Petrosyants, leader of the Soviet delegation and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Atomic Energy, said in an interview to our correspondent Vladimir Dmitriyev.

[Dmitriyev] The attention of the Swiss press and of the representatives of news agencies and press accredited to Palais de Nations is attracted these days by the Soviet-U.S. talks on halting and banning nuclear weapons tests. A routine round, the fifth since July 1986, has begun.

[Petrosyants] These talks are also important because the Soviet Union attached enormous importance to the problem of halting nuclear weapons tests. The Soviet Union was and remains a convinced supporter of the fact that this issue should be resolved as soon as possible and intends to fight for the complete ban of nuclear tests in the course of full scale talks.

It seems that the U.S. side accepts the idea of banning and halting as the ultimate goal but they accept it somehow only in terms of the remote future. The talks that U.S. Secretary of State Shultz had in Moscow in April 1987 are of very great importance. The talks between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Mr Shultz there was mapped out [word indistinct] the thorough deepening of the discussion of the central issues of international security, and in particular of the Soviet-U.S. relations, including the matters of halting nuclear tests.

It is necessary to mention that during these talks the Soviet side proposed to conduct a so-called experiment -- the experiment of conducting nuclear tests on the nuclear test grounds of both the U.S. and Soviet side. This is a new qualitative proposal that we will have to consider as one of the steps to enable us to finally (?conclude) a treaty of halting nuclear weapons tests. [passage indistinct]

Admittedly, for a long time the U.S. side has not been agreeing to conducting full scale talks. It seems that now -- and here we can see after the talks of Shultz, Shevardnadze, and Gorbachev -- whether [word indistinct] in this respect give agreement to the conducting of full scale talks.

We have always been optimists. In this case one should be even more optimistic. [passage indistinct]

Statement at Conclusion

LD291551 Moscow TASS in English 1535 GMT 29 May 87

[Text] Geneva May 29 TASS -- A regular round of the negotiations of Soviet and U.S. experts on issues of stopping nuclear tests drew to an end here today.

Andranik Petrosyants, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy who heads the USSR delegation, made the following statement upon the results of this round:

The Soviet Union attaches immense importance to the problem of terminating nuclear weapon tests, which is vital to mankind. Its solution, which is largely determined by the efforts of the USSR and the United States, would become a significant contribution to containing the arms race, would help improve the international situation and build inter-state confidence.

The nuclear tests, once halted, would block in practice the sources for the development to a new generation of means of mass annihilation, which are perilous to mankind.

As for the USSR, it is as ever a convinced supporter of the earliest solution to this problem and to this end is prepared at any moment, even right now, to get down to working out an accord on banning nuclear tests during full-scale talks. The Soviet Union stands for addressing within the framework of these talks also issues related to the ratification of the threshold treaties of 1974 and 1976, for agreeing to a considerable reduction in the yield of nuclear explosions and in their number. But the goal of the talks should be explicit and clear -- to ban nuclear tests.

Preparing full-scale talks which have as their ultimate goal banning nuclear tests, remained the principal job of the round that ended on May 29.

It is common knowledge that at their meetings in Moscow last April Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Eduard Shevardnadze, foreign minister of the USSR, and George Shultz, U.S. secretary of state, discussed in detail and in-depth the central issues of international security and Soviet-U.S. relations, among them the issues of halting nuclear tests.

The proposals made by the Soviet side at those meetings are designed to shore up the foundation for promoting a concrete dialogue between our countries on this matter too. In view of this, at the just-ended round the Soviet delegation has formulated in key outlines the content of the suggested joint experiment at each other's nuclear test ranges, preparations for which could be launched at full-scale talks.

The outcome of the present round has shown, however, that the U.S. side failed to display a due constructive approach to the solution of the key issue before our delegations -- elaborating an arrangement on the beginning of the full-scale talks which have as their ultimate goal banning nuclear tests.

The Soviet side will continue pressing for the earliest solution to all issues leading to a complete termination of nuclear blasts.

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CSO: 5200/1518

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET ARMY PAPER WRITES ON THRESHOLD TREATY JUBILEE

PM291427 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 87 First Edition p 3

[A. Golts "Commentator's Diary": "'Threshold' Treaties Are a Step Toward an Ultimate Goal, Not the Goal Itself"]

[Text] The Soviet-American Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (and Protocol Thereto) was signed 11 years ago. Under this treaty the USSR and the United States were to limit the yield of individual nuclear explosions carried out for peaceful purposes to 150 kilotons, and group explosions to an aggregate yield of 1.5 megatons. This was the second of the so-called "threshold" treaties concluded in the mid-seventies. The first, the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, was signed in 1974.

It should be noted that the protocols to these important treaties contain detailed verification measures to ensure their observance. Thus, fulfillment of the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes presupposes verification by national technical means, the provision of information, and access to the sites of explosions for the other side's representatives. It lays down that a joint consultative commission be established to discuss any questions of compliance.

The signing of these treaties was undoubtedly an important event, one capable of exerting a beneficial influence on the whole process of nuclear arms talks. This, however, did not happen. The problem was that the agreements, which limited the size of nuclear tests, then proved unacceptable to the ruling circles in America. The American side simply refused to ratify them.

The years passed. And with every new day the nuclear threat to the planet increased: The arsenals of weapons of mass destruction grew and more and more new kinds of weapons were developed and adopted. And nuclear tests acted as a kind of drive belt for this infernal machine. It became quite obvious that bold and constructive new steps were necessary to stop this dangerous course of events.

And those steps were taken. In 1985 the USSR introduced a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. The logic of this step was simple: Stopping the tests meant stopping the development [razrabotka] and improvement of nuclear weapons.

Our moratorium lasted more than 18 months. During this time the arguments of the defenders of nuclear tests were completely rebutted. For 18 months commonsense waged a struggle against militarist narrow-mindedness. Washington simply remained deaf to the demands of the world community contained in a UN General Assembly resolution, appeals by the Nonaligned Movement and the leaders of the "Delhi Six," and the opinion of the peoples, including the American people. In this situation the USSR was forced, as people are aware, to end the moratorium. A historic opportunity to end nuclear tests once and for all was lost through the fault of the American side.

But the struggle goes on. At the present time difficult talks on ending nuclear tests are going on in Geneva between the USSR and the United States. The Soviet stance at the talks is absolutely clear--we were and remain convinced advocates of a complete nuclear test ban. Here the Soviet Union has proposed moving toward this goal in stages by introducing limitations on the number and yield of nuclear explosions. The USSR considers that these measures should be interim in nature. And consequently when taking them it is essential to establish tentative dates for the achievement of a radical solution. It also makes sense in this context to discuss questions of ratifying the "threshold" treaties.

The approach being shown by the Americans is completely different. They want to make these agreements, concluded over 10 years ago, into the main subject of the talks. And propose concentrating on additional verification measures to ensure they are observed. The United States, as has frequently been the case, instead of searching for ways toward a complete nuclear test ban proposes that the Soviet Union take part in merely drawing up regulations for these explosions. Washington remains committed to this approach to date.

But the Soviet Union's principled stand, a stand which expresses the will of the majority of the world's population, is nevertheless also having an impact on American politicians. The House of Representatives recently expressed itself in favor of introducing a 1-year moratorium on explosions with a yield in excess of 1 kiloton. The voice of realism is making headway in Washington's corridors of power. And sooner or later the American administration will have to heed it too.

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CSO: 5200/1518

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET BLOC PROPOSES TOTAL TEST BAN TREATY AT CD

Petrovskiy Presents Document

LD091156 Moscow TASS in English 1052 GMT 9 Jun 87

[Text] Geneva June 9 TASS -- Correspondent Yevgeniy Korzhev writes:

The disarmament conference resumed its work in the Palace of Nations today. The group of socialist countries presented at the first plenary session for consideration by the participants a joint document called Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the General and Complete Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

When submitting this document deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR Vladimir Petrovskiy recalled that the aim of achieving a full prohibition of nuclear tests as a priority measure in stopping the development, production and improvement of nuclear arms, their reduction and elimination, was set at the recent meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Treaty member states.

In submitting this new proposal the socialist countries guide themselves by the striving to stimulate and undelayed commencement of concrete full-scale talks at the multilateral Geneva forum. Their joint document can become a basis for such talks.

Commenting on the content of the document the Soviet representative noted in particular that it includes wide-ranging verification measures, among them the proposal to set up an institute of international inspectors and an international seismic control network with the participation of observers from the international inspectorate.

An important place is given to on-site inspections which should be not voluntary but mandatory. The Soviet Union confirms its positive attitude to the offer of the six states from four continents to provide assistance in carrying out verification and checks.

Vladimir Petrovskiy said further that the drawing of the Geneva international forum into the process of working out the treaty in question should bolster the bilateral talks between time. As of now, he stressed, there are no obstacles on the road to stopping nuclear weapon tests other than the stubborn attempts by the Western nuclear powers to cling to the dangerous concept of nuclear deterrence.

Verification Provisions

LD091434 Moscow TASS in English 1409 GMT 9 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 9 TASS -- The joint document of the group of socialist countries "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the General and Complete Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Tests," submitted to the disarmament conference in Geneva, can and should become the basis for multilateral full-scale talks, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman told a briefing here today.

What is new in this document, he noted, is the approach to questions of verification. Provisions are made for a combination of national and international measures of verification. We are convinced, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman went on, that a ban on nuclear weapons tests is an important step on the road to disarmament. He charged the West of displaying "a myopic, narrow-minded egoistic approach" to the problem of stopping nuclear arms tests.

Further Details

LD091742 Moscow TASS in English 1650 GMT 9 Jun 87

[Text] Geneva June 9 TASS -- The Disarmament Conference resumed its work in the Palace of Nations here today. A joint document of the group of socialist countries "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the General and Complete Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests" was submitted at the first plenary session for consideration by its participants.

When submitting this document deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR Vladimir Petrovskiy recalled that the aim of pressing for a full prohibition of nuclear tests as a priority measure in stopping the development, production and perfection of nuclear weapons and their reduction and liquidation was set at the recent meeting of the political consultative committee of Warsaw Treaty member states.

By making the new proposal the socialist countries guide themselves by the striving to stimulate the undelayed opening of concrete full-scale talks at the Geneva multilateral forum. Their joint document can become a basis for such talks.

The Soviet deputy foreign minister stressed that the banning of talks [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1535 GMT on 9 June in an identical report renders preceding phrase as "banning of tests"] is an important independent measure in the field of limiting and stopping the arms race. It would be of a major military, technical, political, legal and moral importance.

The proposed document puts within a single framework the positive capital accumulated over many years of joint work to solve the problem of nuclear tests and also the new ideas that have appeared lately and proposals made by other countries, first of all the six states from the four continents. At the same time the draft treaty is not simply a sum total of proposals but a qualitatively new document. Its content is imbued with the ideas and spirit of new political thinking which demands that diplomatic practice be brought in line with the realities of the nuclear-space age.

This is shown first of all by the way the question of control and verification is posed, the speaker went on. We believe that such a control is absolutely necessary for an effective implementation of measures of genuine disarmament and confidence-building, especially in conditions of a dire shortage of such confidence. With a view to this the new document includes extensive control measures ranging from the announcement of the locations of testing ranges to the participation of international inspectors in the verification of non-holding of nuclear weapon tests at these ranges.

To ensure effective verification we propose to set up an institute of international inspectors, something that was not provided for either in the Soviet proposal on the treaty's provisions in 1982 or in the Disarmament Committee tripartite reports made by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

The reality and possibility of such forms of verification was clearly demonstrated by the joint experiment of Soviet and American scientists in Semipalatinsk.

The question of setting up an international network of seismic control got new development in the document as well. Seismic stations with standard characteristics whose functioning would involve participation of observers from the international inspectorate would become the basic component of this network. The fulfillment of this proposal would substantially facilitate the creation of a climate of mutual trust among states. Also serving this aim is the special section devoted to the international exchange of data on the radioactivity of air masses.

On-site inspections hold a crucial place in the system of verification that we propose, Vladimir Petrovskiy said further. We see their aim in the solution of questions that give rise to doubt about observance of the treaty and cannot be removed by other verification measures envisaged by it.

The state in which the on-site verification is requested will be obliged unconditionally to provide access to the place stated in such a request. In other words, we are speaking not of voluntary but of mandatory inspections. Of course, the criteria and procedures of requesting an on-site inspection and verification, the holding of inspections, including the list of the rights and functions of the checking personnel, are yet to be drawn up. But the Disarmament Conference can well cope with this work.

Besides, experience of other talks on banning nuclear weapon tests has also been accumulated in this field.

The content of the submitted document's concrete provisions shows once again that no problem of verification of compliance exists for us. We are for a thorough development of all the necessary concrete measures and in this respect are prepared to go as far as our partners are prepared to go.

We are prepared to discuss also other measures of verifying compliance with the treaty. In this connection the speaker again confirmed the Soviet Union's positive attitude to the proposals on this score that were made by the six states from four continents.

The Soviet representative noted further that the drawing of the Disarmament Conference into the practical process of working out the treaty on banning nuclear weapon tests in no way contradicts the ongoing bilateral Soviet-American talks on this question. On the contrary, this should shore up the bilateral efforts by multilateral ones the more so that the bilateral talks, regrettably, are marking time. [sentence as received]

The Soviet Union is prepared to reach agreement on a gradual solution of the task of stopping nuclear tests by introducing interim limitations on the number and yield of nuclear explosions. The announcement of a bilateral moratorium already now could be the first step. Although the USSR would prefer a complete moratorium it is prepared to take into account the position of the United States and reach agreement with it on limiting the yield of testing to one kiloton and to reduce the number of tests to the minimum. Now it is up to the American side to respond.

The Soviet representative stressed that as of now there are no obstacles on the road to stopping nuclear weapon tests other than the stubborn attempts by some western powers to cling to the concept of nuclear deterrence. He noted the false, dangerous and deeply immoral essence of this concept. Nuclear deterrence is an expression of militaristic intentions in concentrated form, it stands for a relentless arms race, perpetuation of international tension, antagonism and enmity, further militarisation of mentality, threat of nuclear proliferation, balancing on the brink of war, and an unreliable ersatz peace subjected to the destructive influence of fear and mutual mistrust, that is everything with which this concept is imbued.

The new political thinking proceeds from recognition of the need and possibility of a nuclear-free world in the interests of mankind's survival, from the premise that relations between states should be regulated by political and legal mechanisms, international organisations, bilateral and multilateral negotiating bodies.

The submission of the basic provisions of the treaty for consideration reflects our deep faith in the possibilities of the disarmament conference as a unique multilateral forum and our desire jointly with everybody who strives for disarmament not in words but in deeds to work to raise the authority and effectiveness of the conference, Vladimir Petrovskiy went on. Every small brick, even a small stone laid by the participants in the conference in the foundation of the common edifice of security will be an earnest of its strength.

Honest dedicated cooperation and co-creativity in the name of disarmament is especially important now when the moment of truth has set in, when the gaining of insight, freedom from the fetters of militaristic mentality, pooling of efforts in the attainment of a nuclear-free and non-violent world are becoming a categorical imperative, the USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs said in conclusion.

The new document and the speech by the Soviet representative have generated much interest.

After his speech Vladimir Petrovskiy held a press conference during which he dwelt once again on the main aspects of the joint document submitted by the group of socialist countries. He also drew attention to the new proposal by the Warsaw Treaty member states to NATO countries to hold consultations at which they could compare the doctrines of the two alliances, discuss the existing imbalances and asymmetries in separate services and armaments and the ways of overcoming them.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: NORDIC NFZ WOULD LIMIT U.S. FREEDOM OF ACTION IN CRISIS

PM131629 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 7 May 87 p 5

[NOVOSTI correspondent Dmitriy Kiselev article: "Under the U.S. Umbrella"]

[Text] Under the bilateral agreement, the U.S. Air Force is given the right to use specially built or modernized Norwegian air bases for bomber aircraft which will attack the Soviet Union. F-111 aircraft, which could have nuclear arms on board, have several times landed at air bases which will be used as transit points (on the way to the Soviet Union). The U.S. Navy has everything it needs in the Norwegian fjords, from protection behind their cliffs and repair bases to forward positions for launching missiles against Soviet territory. The United States is holding land exercises in Norway with increasing frequency. The stockpiles of heavy equipment in Trondelag are sitting waiting for their time to come, and the regional electronic equipment to be used in connection with military operations by all types of troops is in a state of constant readiness. All this in case a "crisis situation" arises.

Up to now, no one has made it clear what is to be read into this key term, or at least has no one done so publicly. The majority of Norwegians probably take the vague term "crisis situation" to mean a "crisis in the North." The fact that the word "North" is missing from the official "crisis situation" definition is ascribed as a rule for the need of brevity in definitions. However, brevity is not what is most important here.

In 1982, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said: "The main concept behind the theory of 'horizontal escalation' is that if we are the target of an attack, we need not only launch a counterattack where the attack took place; we must consider the possibility of also reacting in other areas where it is easier for us to do so, or where we have the most favorable position from a geographical or tactical viewpoint [paragraph continues]

"At the present time we do not intend to adopt this strategy, but we are discussing it." Thus, time has passed and today the "strategy of horizontal escalation" has become a fact.

For Norway, this means that every crisis situation which arises, even if it is somewhere else in the world, could be the go-ahead for a U.S. attack on the Soviet Union from Norwegian territory and Norwegian waters. It would be difficult to find any position more suitable geographically or tactically; in addition, the Americans' "horizontal escalation" is complemented by a "vertical escalation," that is, a possible escalation of the striking power of the armes used, with nuclear arms as the topmost rung on the ladder.

The little detail of "horizontal escalation" is the fruit of U.S. military discussions. It has not been officially discussed in NATO. But this has not prevented the United States from making this its current doctrine. The U.S. allies have simply been confronted with a fait accompli.

In this context, the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone is even less attractive to the Americans and an even more burning issue for the Scandinavians. A zone which simply limited the Americans' possibility of launching attacks from this area would in no way affect their ability to defend themselves, because, according to the conclusions reached by the experts, it is nonsense for a country like Norway to be defended by using nuclear weapons.

However, the point of departure on which NATO bases its doctrines is precisely this possibility of implementing a first strike from the Nordic area, among other possibilities. Here lies the essence of "nuclear deterrence." If a nuclear-free zone were established, Norway and Denmark would no longer be part of this "deterrence policy," which would be meaningless for them. But, at the same time, it would cancel the Soviet Union's need for similar weapons designed to counter this strategy; nor would such a zone in any way commit Norway and Denmark to withdraw from NATO, and it would not change anything about the traditionally stable relations between the countries in the Nordic community.

It goes without saying that a nuclear-free zone would not solve all the security policy problems in the northern regions, but stability undoubtedly would be strengthened. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it gives its support in word and deed to this idea, because such a zone would have a positive effect on the international political climate. For its part, the Soviet Union has not only said that it is willing to give guarantees for a nuclear-free zone, it has also removed medium-range missiles from the Kola Peninsula, is ready to withdraw its nuclear fleet from the Baltic, and has proposed that the intensity of the naval exercises which take place in Norwegian waters be reduced.

At the same time, the military activity which in practice takes place in, and in the vicinity of, Norway, stimulated by the Americans in accordance with their "horizontal escalation," moves Norway farther and farther into the unknown. It is possible that many people in Norway view the military support points and the new technical equipment shipped from across the ocean as individual elements that they do not see as parts of an overall concept. But thinking that way is to miss the forest for the trees.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW CONFIRMS COMMITMENT TO RAROTONGA TREATY

OW140627 Moscow in Mandarin to China 1500 GMT 13 May 87

[Petrov commentary]

[Text] At a news briefing in Moscow, a spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry said: The Soviet Union has signed the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty, and will fulfill its specified obligations.

In this regard, our station observer Petrov pointed out: First of all, we must review the treaty's history. The Rarotonga Treaty was signed and endorsed in 1985 by 13 nations attending the South Pacific Forum. The treaty requests the signatories to call on the five nuclear powers to sign the protocols banning nuclear tests, and not to use, or threaten to use, any nuclear weapons in the South Pacific.

The events, which took place later, have fully demonstrated the role one plays in the struggle to seek peace in the Pacific region. At the end of 1986, the Soviet Union signed the protocols attached to the Rarotonga Treaty. In February this year, the PRC also signed the protocols. In this way, two socialist nations have demonstrated their strong sense of responsibility and showed true concern for the cause of peace. However, the other three nuclear nations not only refused to sign these documents, they openly stated that they would not sign them later.

The spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry pointed out: In spite of all this, the United States, Britain, and France also tried to stir up distrust in the South Pacific against the Soviet Union. In this connection, we would like to cite some examples. In the Pacific region, currently, the United States has 500,000 soldiers, 180 warships, and more than 1,100 fighter aircraft, as well as strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It also has land- and warship-based cruise and Trident missiles. Countless Pacific islands under U.S. control have become proving grounds for guided missiles and SDI weapons. That is why the United States and its new [as heard] allies are unenthusiastic about setting up a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific, and why they regard the Soviet peace-loving steps as something the Soviet Union has done with an ulterior motive. However, all their efforts will be in vain. The Soviet efforts to protect the status of the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific are the best tool for shattering rumor and blasphemy.

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IZVESTIYA: FRENCH TESTS CAUSE DESTRUCTION OF MUROROA

PM081303 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 May 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko dispatch under the "Apt Comments" rubric: "Mururoa Atoll Is Dying, Its Existence Threatened by Nuclear Explosions"]

[Text] Paris -- The nuclear tests being carried out by France on Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific are sentencing it to death.

F. Fillon, chairman of the French National Assembly Defense Commission, acknowledged on his return from the atoll, where he had observed nuclear tests, that Mururoa has suffered considerable damage. Fissures traversing the whole island continue to spread, and this, in the opinion of specialists, will inevitably lead to the atoll's complete destruction.

The destructive consequences of nuclear explosions for Mururoa have been known for a long time now. This is recognized even in a Defense Ministry report. The well-known French scientist H. Tazieff has noted that there is a danger of radioactive substances escaping. Paris has no intention of abandoning its plans, however. F. Fillon stressed that, despite the dangers of destruction of the island, the nuclear tests will not be stopped. He reported that the Defense Ministry has given military specialists the task of reducing the mass and size of nuclear warheads and simultaneously developing new forms of them suitable for the new M-5 missiles armed with 12 warheads.

These demands by the authorities are forcing engineers and technicians to carry out nuclear explosions at the former frequency -- that is, 8-10 a year. Around 100 tests, which are the cause of the atoll's destruction, have been carried out there since 1975. The authorities, however, state that there is no danger and that provided the charges exploded there are not too powerful the tests could allegedly be conducted for many years more. The explosions, F. Fillon said, are only speeding up the natural process of "erosion" of the atoll.

Reports have recently appeared in the press here that Paris may move its nuclear test center to the Kerguelen Islands in the Indian Ocean. However, as Deputy M. Peyre has noted, Mururoa's destruction does not mean that it is necessary to find a new site which will, in turn, face the danger of destruction and prompt protests in other regions of the world. The deputy said France must stop the explosions and the development of new kinds of weapons and do everything possible to help ensure the complete disappearance of nuclear arsenals by the end of the 20th century.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

UNDERGROUND TEST AT SEMIPALATINSK--Moscow, 6 June (TASS)--An underground nuclear explosion with a capacity under 20 kilotons was conducted in the USSR at a test site near Semipalatinsk at 06.04, Moscow time, on 6 June 1987. The explosion was conducted with the aim to check the results of research in the sphere of physics of nuclear explosion. ["TASS Report--Underground Nuclear Explosion"--TASS headline] [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0500 GMT 6 Jun 87 LD] /12858

TASS CITES PRC EXPLOSION--Stockholm, 8 June (TASS)-- A seismic service of Sweden's Defense Ministry has registered a nuclear explosion on the territory of China. Nuclear device less than 150 kilotons was detonated at the Lop Nur test site in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. This is the first Chinese nuclear explosion since December 1984. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1212 GMT 8 Jun 87 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1518

USSR: PREPARATIONS FOR UN THIRD SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

Shevardnadze Letter

LD251245 Moscow TASS in English 1228 GMT 25 May 87

[Text] Moscow, 25 May (TASS)--Follows the full text of a letter sent by the Soviet foreign minister to the UN secretary general concerning the UN General Assembly's forthcoming 3rd special session on disarmament:

Dear Mr Secretary-General,

The unanimous decision by the U.N. General Assembly to convene the Third Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament in 1988 has been welcomed with satisfaction in the Soviet Union.

The third special session will be prepared and held at a critical, crucial moment in world affairs.

On the one hand, the awareness of the catastrophic nature of nuclear war has been growing and the idea of delivering mankind from the ruinous systems of mass destruction has been gaining ever stronger support.

The Soviet Union, as a nuclear power, has been applying every effort for a practical realization of a concept for a demilitarized, democratic and non-violent world.

The January 15, 1986 program for security through disarmament, Reykjavik and the following Soviet initiatives have given a new dimension to the problem of curtailing military arsenals and made it possible to draw the outlines of a nuclear-free future.

On the other hand, the arms race has been rapidly gaining in speed and the "Star Wars" plans are threatening to carry it into new areas and lend it an added scope.

Civilization is at a nuclear and space crossroads where it will have to make what will apparently be the most serious choice in its history -- to be or not to be.

The Soviet Union is convinced that international relations ought to be rebuilt along the lines of forging a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

The most important routes to this goal, in our opinion, are those of eliminating nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, preventing an arms race in outer space, and confining the military potentials of states to the limit of reasonable sufficiency.

Developing the complex of military-political parameters of such a system presupposes a broad approach to disarmament as a package of inter-related measures for limiting and reducing arms, strengthening trust, adjusting mechanisms for verification, and switching the funds being released over to peaceful development purposes.

The extensive democratic dialogue getting under way on the foundations of security for all will make it possible to work out the more efficient ways of remodelling international relations in keeping with the aspirations of all peoples and concentrate on building a really humane and demilitarized world.

A big contribution to promoting this dialogue and concretizing it in the military-political field should be made by the U.N. General Assembly's Third Special Session on Disarmament.

It is important that from the very beginning it should be seen as an extraordinary event both for the nature of placing issues and for the new phase in efforts by the world community to stop the arms race and proceed from declarations to creating a favorable international environment for attaining really tangible results at talks on limiting and reducing arms. [sentence as received]

The issue of ways and means of changing over to a nuclear-free world will undoubtedly be in the focus of attention at the session. The statement of January 15, 1986, suggested specific phases for nuclear disarmament. They effectively constitute the pivot of the comprehensive program for disarmament to be considered by the session.

While singling out the problem of destroying nuclear weapons, we at the same [time] believe that the destruction of nuclear arms should be accompanied by the prohibition and limitation of the other kinds of weapons of mass annihilation, conventional arms and military activities, which are important separate ways of building comprehensive security in the military field.

The aim of the international community in the final analysis is general and complete disarmament, a commitment to which should be reaffirmed at the special session with fresh vigor.

Taking the relay baton from the previous two special sessions devoted to disarmament, the third special session is called upon to highlight the pressing tasks of disarmament for today and tomorrow.

The session will make it possible to project the basic provisions of the final document of the first special session on disarmament, which has formed the historic basis for a multilateral approach in this field, onto the perspective of achieving a nuclear-free world and dovetail them organically with the needs of forging comprehensive security.

In practical terms, the session could solve issues connected with increasing the efficiency of multilateral mechanisms, singling out in the process the role of the United Nations.

The time has come for the United Nations to feel themselves an integral entity adjusting the equilibrium of general security not with the force of arms but with reason and morals.

The United Nations should actively facilitate all phases for reducing military potentials and become a guarantor of states' security, especially in the post-nuclear situation, and a regulator for maintaining the equilibrium at the level of reasonable sufficiency, with a permanent trend for the latter's decline.

As for the agenda for the forthcoming special session, the Soviet Union believes that it should be geared to achieve real progress in limiting the arms race and bringing about disarmament and to using the U.N. potential in the field ever more actively.

It is important that dialogue at the session be purposeful and crowned with the adoption of a substantive, even if a brief, final document which would, along with setting guidelines for a nuclear-free and safe world, also chart specific routes towards it, including the fostering of an adequate political atmosphere based on trust, mutual understanding, public candor, openness and predictability in international affairs.

The session will reflect an exceptionally important period mankind is living through. What will be the hopes, plans and accomplishments with which mankind will enter the third millennium? There is not so much time left to all of us to usher in a new historical era.

We propose declaring the '90s a decade for building a nuclear-free and non-violent world.

We count on the session providing a forum for constructive and productive efforts by the world community to curtail the arms race, for bold decisions acceptable to all and for a creative quest for common ground in the positions of all groups of states.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we intend actively to facilitate its success.

Soviet Representative Comments

LD282126 Moscow TASS in English 2023 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] New York, 28 May (TASS)--TASS correspondent Sergey Baybakov reports:

The preparatory committee for the convocation of the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament continues working at the United Nations headquarters. Its task is to draft the agenda in which the main item will be the ways and means of transition to a nuclear weapons-free world. During the debate, many delegations point out that the coming forum will not be an ordinary one.

The special session of the U.N. General Assembly must become an important stage in creating an all-embracing system of international security, in asserting by the United Nations of a concept of new political thinking, in shaping the common view of a nuclear weapons-free and non-violent world, USSR representative B.P. Krasulin said, specifically.

It is important that the special session should actually help enhancing the efficiency of the very mechanism of disarmament, particularly at the talks on arms limitation and reduction. The Soviet representative declared for greater openness in the work of the preparatory committee, in favor of the need to take into account during the preparation for the special session of the opinion of broad public declaring for the consolidation of peace and disarmament.

The Soviet Union's striving to start during the work of the preparatory committee an open dialogue aimed at the quest of points of contact of the positions of all the groups of states meets with a positive response of most delegates.

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TASS CITES HUNGARIAN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CURB PLAN

PM211559 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 87 First Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Constructive Proposal"]

[Text] New York, 19 May -- The Hungarian delegation submitted the working document "Disarmament in the Conventional Arms Sphere" on Monday for discussion by the participants in the current 54th session of the UN Disarmament Commission. It gives a detailed account of the socialist countries' approach to this very important problem, which, together with the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons, is an indispensable condition of ensuring international security.

It is essential first and foremost to cardinaly reduce armed forces and conventional arms on the European Continent, where the two largest military groups, equipped with the most up-to-date weapons, confront one another, the document stresses. It points out that this is precisely the aim of the program put forward by the Warsaw Pact states in June 1986 addressed to all European states and also the United States and Canada.

The socialist countries note that all the proposed reductions would be implemented under the conditions of reliable, effective verification, including on-site inspection. For the purpose of carrying out this verification they propose the institution of an international consultative commission involving representatives of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and also interested neutral and nonaligned European states.

The socialist countries believe that the Convention on the Prohibition or Limitation of the Use of Specific Types of Conventional Weapons, opened to signature in 1981, is a concrete result of the international community's efforts to achieve disarmament in the conventional arms sphere. They stress the importance of as many states as possible, particularly those with the greatest military potential, becoming signatories to this convention and ratifying it.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS CITES TIME ON U.S. THIRD-GENERATION N-WEAPONS

PM261339 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 May 87 Morning Edition p 1

[TASS dispatch "United States: Third Generation of Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] New York, 18 May--TIME magazine reports that the United States is actively working on the creation of third generation nuclear weapons.

While first- and second-generation nuclear weapons were capable of causing vast, uncontrollable destruction, third-generation weapons will be capable of "highly selective action," the magazine writes. Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, has confirmed that a program for the creation of such weapons, code-named "Prometheus," is going ahead at full speed.

Third-generation nuclear weapons, the magazine points out, "include a bomb whose main destructive force are microwaves. Exploded in space, this bomb can put enemy command center electronic equipment out of action." It is believed that a 10 megaton charge will be able to turn unprotected electronic equipment on earth within a radius of around 3,200 km into "useless debris." U.S. specialists believe that microwaves could become an effective weapon for destroying enemy mobile missiles on earth.

According to specialists, TIME emphasizes, "the administration's desire to create a new generation of nuclear weapons is the main reason why the United States is refusing to accept Soviet proposals to ban nuclear tests."

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS: SCIENTISTS FORUM ON PEACE IN NUCLEAR AGE ENDS

LD210122 Moscow TASS in English 2000 GMT 20 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 20 TASS -- A two-day meeting attended by well-known scientists and public figures from Eastern and Western countries which came to a close here today discussed new approaches to ensuring durable peace in a nuclear-space age. They continued a discussion that started last February at the Moscow international forum "For Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity."

The meeting was organized by the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat, and the Scientific Council for the Study of Problems of Peace and Disarmament.

Soviet participants in the meeting called attention to the principle of reasonable sufficiency of military potentials worked out by the 27th CPSU Congress, and to proposals contained in the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Treaty member countries.

These proposals provide for a steady reduction of the armed forces and armaments in Europe to the level which would be sufficient only for defense, only for repulsing an aggression, and which would not permit European countries, including the two alliances confronting each other, to stage any offensive operations.

Representatives of the public from Britain, West Germany, Denmark, the U.S. and other Western countries spoke, in their turn, about the concept of military detente worked out in those countries, specifically, that of "non-offensive defense."

Participants in the meeting expressed satisfaction over the content of the discussion which was held in a businesslike and open atmosphere. Agreement was reached on continuing and deepening the dialogue.

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END